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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Purpose of the study 
 
In this Thesis I evaluate the value creation from corporate divestitures by studying European 
spin-offs over the period 1994-2006. I check the abnormal returns to parent shareholders 
following a spin-off announcement, and try to explain these returns by regressing them 
against relative size of the spin-off, increase in industry and geographical focus and change 
in operating performance. I also measure the long-run abnormal returns for the parent and 
the spun off subsidiary over five years around the announcement and the industry adjusted 
change in operating performance following a completed spin-off. The role of these tests is to 
facilitate the analysis regarding the sources behind the value creation. 
 
Data 
 
The data used in this study was collected from several sources. The spin-off events and 
company details were taken from SDC Platinum, financial statement information from 
Thomson OneBanker Worldscope database and the stock price information from Datastream. 
All this data was collected for the parents, spun-off subsidiaries and benchmarks. The final 
sample for testing the announcement effects consisted of 164 European spin-offs of which 
120 were completed. The samples for testing long-run abnormal returns and changes in 
operating performance became smaller as data was not available for all observations. 
 
 
Results 
 
I find positive and statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns of +1.83% to the 
shareholders of the parent companies over (-1,1) days around the spin-off announcement. 
This value increases to 1.92% when only the sample of completed spin-offs is evaluated and 
further to 2.38% in the sample of only focus increasing spin-offs. This value creation is 
significantly related to the relative size of the spin-off. Increase in industrial focus, increase 
in geographical focus and change in operating performance show no significant explanation 
power. I also find insignificant long run abnormal returns for each subperiod in the four-year 
period around the spin-off announcement. Similarly, the change in operating performance, 
measured as the change in industry-adjusted return on assets, is not significantly different 
from zero over a five-year period around the spin-off announcement. 
 
 
Keywords 
 
Spin-off, divestiture, abnormal return, operating performance, event study 
 
 2
TIIVISTELMÄ 
 
 
Tutkimuksen tavoitteet 
 
Käsittelen tässä Pro Gradu –tutkielmassani Eurooppalaisten spin-offien arvonluontia vuosien 
1994 ja 2006 välillä. Selvitän emoyhtiöiden osakkeiden ylituotot suhteessa 
markkinaindeksiin spin-offin julkistuspäivän ympärillä sekä pyrin selittämään näitä 
ylituottoja regressiolla, jossa selittävinä tekijöinä ovat spin-offin suhteellinen koko, 
toimialafokuksen kasvu, liiketoiminnan tehokkuuden muutos sekä maantieteellisen fokuksen 
kasvu. Mittaan myös pitkän aikavälin ylituotot sekä emo- , että tytäryhtiöille ja 
liiketoiminnan tehokkuuden muutoksen emoyhtiöille viiden vuoden ajanjaksolta 
julkistamispäivän ympärillä. Nämä tulokset toimivat apuna kun määritän syitä luodulle 
arvolle. 
 
 
Data 
 
Käytetty tutkimusdata on kerätty useista lähteistä. Spin-off tapahtumat sekä tiedot yhtiöistä 
keräsin SDC Platinum –tietokannasta, tilinpäätösinformaation Thomson OneBanker 
Worldscope –tietokannasta sekä osakemarkkinainformaation Datastreamista. Keräsin kaikki 
tiedot emoyhtiöille ja tytäryhtiöille. Lisäksi hain benchmark –arvot, joihin tuloksia verrataan. 
Lyhyen aikavälin osaketuottoihin liittyvissä testeissä verrokkina toimi kunkin maan yleinen 
osakemarkkinaindeksi sekä pitkän aikavälin tuottoihin liittyvissä testeissä yleinen 
eurooppalainen osakemarkkinaindeksi. Tilinpäätösinformaatioon liittyvissä testeissä 
verrokkina käytin puolestaan toimialan mediaanituloksia. Lopullinen otos koostui 164 
julkistetusta spin-offista, joista 120 oli viety päätökseen. 
 
 
Tulokset 
 
Tutkimukseni eurooppalaiset spin-offit luovat keskimäärin +1,83%:n ylituotot emoyhtiön 
osakkeenomistajille julkistuspäivän ympärillä (-1,+1 päivää). Tämä tulos on tilastollisesti 
merkitsevä 1% merkitsevyystasolla. Päätökseen viedyillä spin-offeilla keskimääräinen 
ylituotto on +1,92% ja toimialafokusta lisäävillä spin-offeilla +2,38%. Tämä arvonluonti on 
positiivisesti yhteydessä spin-offin suhteelliseen kokoon. Muilla regression selittävillä 
tekijöillä ei ole tilastollisesti merkitsevää vaikutusta. Pitkän aikavälin ylituotot ja 
liiketoiminnan tehokkuuden muutos eivät kumpikaan eroa tilastollisesti nollasta. 
 
 
Asiasanat 
 
Spin-off, divestointi, ylituotto, liiketulos, event study
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background and motivation to the study 
 
”The Board and management of Outokumpu believe that the listing of 
Outokumpu Technology as an independent company on the Helsinki 
Stock Exchange, with its own focus, will improve the strategic 
focus and prospects for continued business development for both 
companies, also considering the limited synergies between the two 
companies. As two listed companies, both Outokumpu's and Outokumpu 
Technology's valuations will be more transparent in the market.”1
 
Above is an extract from a press release from June 2006 by Outokumpu, a Finnish stainless 
steel company, justifying its decision to divest Outokumpu Technology, one of its 
subsidiaries that operates in a different sector than the parent company. Reasons listed for 
the divestiture in the press release are increase in strategic focus, limited synergies and 
transparency in the valuation of the two companies if traded separately. This example 
illustrates how concentrating on core business has recently gained popularity as a corporate 
strategy. Together with this trend towards focus, divestitures have become commonplace. In 
fact, corporate focus is the most cited reason for companies to divest. Divestitures generally 
mean disposing of parts of a business, and are effectively mirror images of mergers and 
acquisitions. We know that mergers and acquisitions are common and that they are generally 
associated with positive wealth effects. Why do divestitures occur then? Both fundamental 
finance theory and common intuition tell us that arbitrarily chopping a company into pieces 
cannot affect its value. Still divestitures are very common, so there must be some value 
consequences in them. And in fact it seems that there are; most previous studies, such as 
Schipper and Smith (1983) and Hite and Owers (1983), along with several recent papers, 
report positive abnormal returns following a spin-off or some other divestiture 
announcement. However, the sources of this value creation, although having been studied 
quite extensively, are not completely clear. 
 
Generally companies have three basic alternatives available to them when they want to 
divest a part of their operations or assets. One of them is a spin-off. A spin-off is defined as a 
pro-rata distribution of a firm’s subsidiary’s shares to the shareholders of the parent 
                                                 
1 Source: http://www.outokumpu.com/pages/Page____9933.aspx 
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company. A spin-off results in neither a dilution of equity nor a transfer of ownership. It 
effectively divides a consolidated firm into two or more firms with an identical initial set of 
shareholders and as a result an independent public entity is formed. The other two main 
divestiture types are an asset sale to an external buyer and an equity carve-out. An asset sale 
is a sale of a subsidiary to a third party that is usually privately negotiated and, like a bank 
loan or private placement, entails little public disclosure (Slovin et al. 1995). An equity 
carve-out is an initial public offering of subsidiary equity. It generates cash to the parent 
company in exchange for subsidiary shares. Generally parent companies retain controlling 
interest in the carved-out subsidiaries and therefore equity carve-outs are only partial 
divestitures. However, equity carve-outs often serve as the first step in the complete 
divestiture of the subsidiary. Occasionally they are used for the sole purpose of raising funds 
to e.g. repay debt and therefore cannot always be considered as pure divestitures. 
 
As becomes evident from the definitions of the different divestiture types, spin-offs differ 
from asset sales and equity carve-outs in one substantial aspect; they do not involve a cash 
transaction. This feature of spin-offs among different divestiture methods makes them an 
interesting subject for studies regarding the value of business, organized as one entity vis-à-
vis two separate entities. Because equity carve-outs and asset sales involve a cash transaction 
to the seller, it is possible that they are motivated by the cash payment in addition to, or 
instead of, efficiency reasons. Therefore these divestitures can be used as a means to raise 
capital as well as restructure the business. Spin-offs, on the other hand, are more pure 
restructuring decisions and hence the most suitable a divestiture type for my study.  
 
 
1.2. Research problem, objectives and main findings 
 
In this thesis I study European spin-offs and their wealth effects using stock market 
information and operating performance changes. What makes this particular study 
interesting is that there are very few studies so far done with European data, and even fewer 
of those that use accounting data to supplement stock market data. My study is in part based 
on Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004), who studied both announcement effects and long run 
stock performance of European spin-offs. Their findings on announcement effects were 
consistent with several U.S. studies, but their results on the long run stock performance 
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differed substantially from those of the U.S. studies. Therefore, in addition to verifying the 
announcement effects of European spin-offs, my study tackles the differences in the long run 
stock performances of the previous studies. The use of accounting data should facilitate this 
analysis. 
 
The purpose of this study is hence to examine the value creation in European spin-offs using 
both the stock market reactions and accounting based operating performance measures. 
There are three main objectives in my study. The first objective is to check the stock market 
announcement effect of spin-offs in Europe over 1994-2006. The second is to find out the 
long run abnormal stock performance of these spin-offs and compare that to the results from 
the U.S. studies. The final objective is to explain the potential differences in the long run 
stock performance following spin-offs between Europe and the U.S. by analysing the 
industry adjusted post spin-off operating performance and checking the post spin-off 
takeover activity. 
 
The research problem can be expressed with two research questions: 
 
1. Do European spin-offs lead to abnormal stock returns at the announcement as well 
as in the long run?  
2. Does industry adjusted operating performance improve after spin-offs? 
 
The main findings of my thesis are the following. I find positive and statistically significant 
cumulative abnormal returns of +1.83% to the shareholders of the parent companies over (-
1,1) days around the spin-off announcement. This value increases to 1.92% when only the 
sample of completed spin-offs is evaluated and further to 2.38% in the sample of only focus 
increasing spin-offs. This value creation is significantly related to the relative size of the 
spin-off. Increase in industrial focus, increase in geographical focus and change in operating 
performance show no significant explanation power. I also find insignificant long run 
abnormal returns for each subperiod in the four-year period around the spin-off 
announcement. Similarly, the change in operating performance, measured as the change in 
industry-adjusted return on assets, is not significantly different from zero over a five-year 
period around the spin-off announcement. 
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1.3. Related studies 
 
Spin-offs have been studied quite extensively in the financial literature, especially in the U.S. 
The first spin-off studies were conducted in the early 1980s, with papers from Hite and 
Owers (1983), Schipper and Smith (1983) and Miles and Rosenfeld (1983). Most of the 
earlier studies report positive announcement returns to the shareholders of the parent 
company, ranging between +2.8% and +4.5%. These abnormal returns were positively 
related to the relative size of the spin-off. Also spin-offs of subsidiaries that operate in a 
different industry than the parent create more value than spin-offs of subsidiaries from a 
related industry. These results imply that focus has been one of the central value drivers in 
spin-offs.  
 
Desai et al. (1999) also report positive significant abnormal returns at announcement. In 
addition, they found positive long run abnormal returns and significant improvements in the 
operating performance of focus increasing parents. Similar results were reported by Cusatis 
et al. (1993). They also added that the significant abnormal long run stock returns were 
strongly and positively related to the post spin-off takeover activity. Johnson et al. (1996) 
complemented the analysis of Cusatis et al. (1993) by studying a sample from which the 
subsequently acquired spin-offs were eliminated. They reported improved operating 
efficiency following the spin-offs. Overall the U.S. studies have found significant positive 
wealth effects through spin-offs using both the announcement effects and the long run 
performance, both from the stock market performance and accounting measures. 
 
As already stated, most of the previous spin-off studies come from the U.S. However, one of 
the non-U.S. studies is that of Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) who examined European 
spin-offs over 1987-2000. Consistent with the U.S. studies, they reported a positive 
announcement reaction of +2.62% to the parent’s shareholders. On the other hand, unlike the 
U.S. studies, Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) reported insignificant abnormal long run 
stock performance. Reasons for these differences between the studies remain unclear. The 
authors suggest that the European capital market can be more efficient than their U.S. 
counterpart, and conclude that the announcement effect already entirely captures the value 
effect of a corporate spin-off.  
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Another European spin-off study was carried out by Katja Keskitalo (2003). In her master’s 
thesis she studied the announcement effects and the spin-off likelihood. Her finding of 
significant cumulative abnormal return of +3.27% at announcement is in line with the 
previous studies. She reported leverage, relative size of the spin-off and the firm size as 
sources of value creation. On the other hand, industry and geographic focus, shareholder 
protection, information asymmetry and growth prospects were not significant determinants 
of abnormal returns. 
 
In addition to Keskitalo, several master’s theses have dealt with spin-offs. Vainio (2007) 
studied in his master’s thesis the characteristics and abnormal returns in Finnish corporate 
divestments between 2001 and 2006. He also found a positive and significant announcement 
return of +0.51% for his sample of 183 divestments of various types. Vainio reports a 
negative relationship between state ownership and abnormal returns, which is contradictory 
to his expectation. In the regression model, he used operating performance change as an 
explanatory variable but did not find conclusive results for the entire sample. In two sectors, 
namely consumer discretionary and consumer staples, the change in ROCE had significant 
explanatory power in abnormal returns. 
 
Rejman’s master’s thesis is titled “Why Corporations Carve out or Spin off? Motivation and 
Market Response to the Announcements with Global Evidence 1994-2003”. He studied 93 
carve-outs and 127 spin-offs globally and found positive and significant CARs, +1.56% for 
carve-outs and +1.70% for spin-offs. Divestiture type choice and motivation to divest were 
studied carefully and the main conclusion was that bigger, less leveraged and more profitable 
parents tend to carve out rather than spin off. 
 
Koivuneva (2008) studied in his master’s thesis the interplay between M&A and spin-off 
decisions. He studied consecutive deals that include both a takeover and a spin-off and 
evaluated which one is generally done first. Koivuneva argues that in theory there should be 
no advantages for the sellers to reorganize before a takeover, i.e. facilitate the subsequent 
takeover, and thus there should not be more pre-acquisition spin-offs than there are those 
done after acquisition. However, his results show that pre-acquisition spin-offs are more 
common and that sellers try to make the subsidiary more attractive by reorganizing before 
acquisition. 
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Previous master’s theses done at Helsinki School of Economics (HSE) have looked at spin-
offs from several perspectives and thus form a comprehensive network of studies that help 
understand spin-offs. The issues covered include the magnitude of value creation, spin-off 
likelihood, the effect of state ownership on value creation, various motivations to divest and 
the interplay between acquisitions and spin-offs. We have learned that spin-offs create value 
in the amount of a few percentage points to the parent shareholders. We also know that spin-
off as a divestiture type is chosen generally by more leveraged, smaller and less profitable 
companies and that spin-offs are sometimes used to facilitate subsequent acquisitions. 
However, the fundamental sources behind the value created through spin-offs is not 
addressed, and this is how my study aims to contribute to this web of spin-off studies 
conducted at HSE.  
 
Overall, the previous studies show a strong consensus regarding positive announcement 
effects of spin-offs. However, both the scarcity of European research papers and the 
increased number of European spin-offs in recent years, together with partly differing results 
with the U.S. studies, suggest that there is still need for further research. Furthermore, 
previous studies have not presented a consensus whether the sources of value creation stem 
from efficiency or information reasons.  
 
 
1.4. Contribution and limitations 
 
This study contributes to the existing spin-off literature in the following ways. First, I use a 
more up to date and larger data sample than Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) to verify 
their results on the announcement effects and long run stock performance of European spin-
offs. Second, this is one of the first studies with European spin-off data that uses accounting 
based operating performance measures to further elaborate on the wealth effects. Third, my 
study provides indirect implications on the Efficient Market Hypothesis in European capital 
markets by looking at the long run abnormal returns following spin-offs, changes in 
operating performance and the subsequent takeover activity. Simultaneous analysis of these 
results allows to draw conclusions on whether all value created is immediately reflected in 
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the stock price as suggested by the EMH. Therefore, my study provides a very 
comprehensive evaluation of European spin-offs and their wealth effects. Finally, as the 
majority of the prior spin-off research is done using U.S. data, I have the opportunity to 
compare results obtained from completely different markets and potentially distinguish 
between fundamental and market specific explanations of these results.  
 
Moreover, my study contributes to the series of previous master’s theses on spin-offs done at 
Helsinki School of Economics by comprehensively evaluating the sources behind value 
creation. Previous master’s theses have already examined the wealth effects, spin-off 
likelihood, subsequent takeover activity and motivations to divest. My study aims to 
complete this picture by offering explanations on the sources of value creation that together 
with the previous results increases the overall knowledge of spin-offs. 
 
The main limitations in my thesis stem from data availability and the related method choices. 
First, some studies have used the standard deviation of analyst forecasts on earnings per 
share as a proxy for asymmetric information. I do not include a variable on asymmetric 
information in my regression model, since there was not enough analyst forecast data 
available for the companies in my sample. Therefore, I have to resort to indirect evidence on 
the effect of information asymmetry on spin-off value creation based on results from 
efficiency variables. Second, finding feasible matches for each of the sample companies 
from their own industry and country in Europe presented such difficulties that I had to resort 
to using industry medians and a general European stock market index as benchmarks. I must 
note that these methods are also well approved in financial literature and that they have been 
shown to provide very similar results with the matching firm approach (Desai and Jain, 
1999), but my first choice of method would have been matching firm approach rather than 
using industry medians and an equity index. 
 
 
1.5. Structure of the study 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section more thoroughly reviews the 
earlier literature on divestitures and spin-offs and presents the theoretical framework that is 
used in the hypothesis building. Section 3 then outlines the hypotheses that are based on the 
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theoretical framework and tested in the empirical part. Section 4 presents the data used and 
section 5 the methodology employed in the study. Section 6 gives the empirical results 
obtained and their analysis as well as interpretation. Finally section 7 concludes the thesis 
and gives suggestions for further research. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
 
In this section I present the main issues covered in the previous studies. First I present the 
possible motives for companies to carry out divestitures. This discussion is based on 
fundamental corporate finance theories and the related potential reasons why spin-offs might 
create value to shareholders. The second part of this section outlines the empirical results 
from previous spin-off studies. 
 
 
2.1. Potential sources of wealth gains 
 
This subsection presents the potential reasons why spin-offs might create shareholder value. 
A relevant starting point for this analysis is found from the familiar propositions by 
Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1961) on capital structure and dividends. They argue that in a 
world without transaction costs and with perfect information symmetry, the value of a firm is 
independent of its capital structure and dividend policy. This theory can be applied to 
divestitures as well. Their theory suggests that with the same assumptions of zero transaction 
and information costs the corporate organization is irrelevant. There are two important 
implications from these theories to my thesis. First, firm value cannot be increased by 
arbitrarily chopping it into pieces. Second, if value creation is possible through divestitures, 
the sources for value increase must come from Modigliani and Miller’s assumptions and 
their infeasibility in the real world. In other words, possible sources of wealth gains must 
stem from either information or transaction costs (e.g. improvement in efficiency).  
 
There are three main theoretical explanations for the value creation through corporate 
restructurings. First is the theory on incentives and monitoring costs, put forward by Alchian 
and Demsetz (1972) and developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). At the heart of this 
theory is the idea that divestitures can facilitate monitoring of companies through lower 
monitoring costs, put pressure on the management and thus improve performance. Second 
explanation emphasizes the significance of information in corporate valuation. Myers and 
Majluf (1984) argue that corporate restructurings can signal information because managers 
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possess information not known to the market. The third theoretical explanation comes from 
the early work of Coase (1937), where he argues that the choice between firm and market is 
a function of relative transaction costs. According to this theory restructurings occur as a 
response to changes in transaction costs. In conclusion, divestitures can be rational decisions 
on theoretical grounds, and they can have an effect on the value of the company. The 
assumptions in the MM irrelevance hypothesis do not hold in the real world and divestitures 
can reveal information, improve efficiency or do both at the same time to affect the firm 
value. 
 
Next I am going to discuss company focus and its effect on value. Given the reasoning above, 
the structure of a company can have an effect on the value of the business. Furthermore, 
corporate focus is often cited as one of the main reasons to divest assets or subsidiaries. 
Hence it is natural to start the literature review by looking at the studies on focus and 
diversification before moving on to spin-off specific studies. 
 
 
2.1.1. Focus vs. diversification 
 
A distinct body of finance literature has given attention to diversification’s effect on firm 
value. Majority of these papers, such as Berger and Ofek (1995), Comment and Jarrell 
(1995), Daley et al. (1997) and John and Ofek (1995), report a significant diversification 
discount. However, later studies by Graham et al. (2002) and Villalonga (2004a, 2004b) 
question these findings by pointing out certain shortcomings in the previous studies. 
Villalonga (2004a) even reports a diversification premium. 
 
Berger and Ofek (1995) imputed stand alone values for diversified companies’ different 
business segments. Comparison of the sum of these values to the company value was used to 
reveal any diversification effect on value. The median ratios of total capital to assets, sales 
and earnings for single-segment firms were computed for a given industry. For multiple-
segment firms these ratios were multiplied by the firm’s values in each segment and summed 
to create an imputed value as a weighted average. Berger and Ofek (1995) used a ratio of 
actual value to imputed value as a measure for excess value. They report a diversification 
discount of 13-15%. The reasons behind these results were overinvestment in segments of 
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low Tobin’s q, and therefore low growth opportunities, and cross-subsidization of poorly 
performing divisions. The diversification discount was reduced by a modest decrease in 
taxes and it was also positively related to the number of business segments in the company. 
 
Comment and Jarrell (1995) took a different approach to study the effect of diversification 
on firm value. They analysed the trends in corporate focus during the 1980s and used stock 
market data to compute the related wealth effects. They reported that corporate focus 
increased significantly between 1979 and 1988, using five different measures. Furthermore, 
this increase in focus was associated with wealth gains when focus was measured with asset- 
or revenue based Herfindahl index. These findings support the diversification discount, also 
reported in Berger and Ofek (1995). Finance theory suggests that diversification increases 
company’s debt capacity. Comment and Jarrell (1995) tested this hypothesis and found that, 
on the contrary to theory, debt capacity usage did not seem to increase with diversification. 
 
Daley et al. (1997) used spin-offs to study the wealth effects of focus and diversification. 
More specifically, they tested whether spin-offs of subsidiaries that are from an unrelated 
industry create more value than spin-offs of subsidiaries that are from the same industry as 
the parent. They report an abnormal return of +1.6% for related industry spin-offs and an 
abnormal return of +4.5% for unrelated industry spin-offs. This suggests that focus creates 
value and diversification discount exists. Daley et al. (1997) used also accounting measures 
to study the change in operating performance following the spin-off. They report a 
significant improvement in the operational efficiency of the parent company. Moreover, the 
source of the increase in the return on assets was improved profit margin through costs 
savings rather than asset turnover. On the contrary to Berger and Ofek (1995), cross-
subsidization of poorly performing units within the firm did not contribute to these results.  
 
John and Ofek (1995) studied 258 asset sales over 1986-1988 and found a cumulative 
abnormal return of +1.5% at announcement. Regression analysis showed that sale of 
unrelated assets creates significantly more value than sale of related assets. This finding is 
consistent with previous studies and the corporate focus hypothesis, which states that 
focused companies operate more efficiently. John and Ofek (1995) checked this using 
accounting measures and reported that the operating performance of the seller indeed 
improved. In addition, some of the seller’s gains stemmed from a better fit between the sold 
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asset and the buyer. The reported motivation for divestitures was the elimination of negative 
synergies and improving the profitability and efficiency of remaining assets. These also 
seemed to be the sources of wealth gains found. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, there is a 
cash transaction involved in asset sales and thus they can be motivated by means of raising 
cash rather than increasing efficiency and focus. However, John and Ofek (1995) tested this 
and reported that focus had more weight than the usage of sale proceeds in explaining the 
value change. Thus the evidence is in favour of the diversification discount. 
 
Studies conducted in the 1990s systematically report the existence of a diversification 
discount. A paper by Graham et al. (2002) questions these findings. They used 365 
diversification-increasing acquisitions over 1980-1995 and report combined CARs of +3.4%. 
When Berger and Ofek (1995) technique was applied the excess value was substantially 
reduced producing rather mixed results. Overall, these results question the existence of the 
diversification discount and focus as a value-enhancing driver. They claim that 
diversification discount is linked to the characteristics of the acquired firms, more 
specifically they being already discounted when acquired. Therefore stand-alone companies 
cannot be used as a benchmark for corporate segments. Consequently, the diversification 
discount reported in earlier studies is most likely overstated because they use these incorrect 
benchmarks for conglomerate divisions.  
 
Belen Villalonga completed two related studies in 2004 regarding diversification’s effect on 
firm value. She used Business Information Tracking Series (BITS) to examine whether the 
earlier reported diversification discount is merely an artefact of segment data. BITS is a new 
census database that covers the entire U.S. economy at the establishment level and, 
according to the author, enables the construction of business units that are more consistently 
and objectively defined than segments. Villalonga (2004a) used the BITS data on a sample 
that produced a diversification discount according to segment data, and in fact, reported a 
diversification premium. She concluded that the results in previous studies have been 
affected by the noisiness of the segment data. Her findings still lack support from other 
studies and the main contribution of this paper was to question the data used in the previous 
studies and hence pinpointing new requirements for the further research. 
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A related paper by Villalonga (2004b) asks whether it is diversification itself that causes the 
reported diversification discount, or some other factor. First, she verifies the finding of her 
earlier paper that, on average, diversification does not destroy value. She argues that 
propensities to diversify differ across companies and hence there is non-randomness of 
diversification that must be accounted for. When this non-randomness is controlled for, the 
diversification discount diminishes. Villalonga notes that the assumptions behind these 
methods are not fully supported by corporate data. However, the shortcomings of previous 
studies reporting diversification discount are pointed out, and the question still remains. 
 
I have outlined the most important studies regarding corporate focus, diversification and 
their effects on firm value. Most of the studies from the 1990s report a strong and significant 
diversification discount and a positive relationship between focus and value. However, later 
studies from the 21st century challenge these findings by pointing out certain limitations in 
the earlier studies. Then again, the existence of a diversification premium is not widely 
reported either and the question remains unresolved. Nevertheless, the fact remains that 
divestitures are common and corporate focus is one of the most cited reasons for them. Next 
I will go over the specific reasons why spin-offs might create value. 
 
 
2.1.2. Information asymmetry 
 
Complexity, undervaluation and pure play
 
This explanation is based on the information asymmetry between shareholders and managers 
as well as on the ability of investors to value companies, i.e. transparency of the companies. 
Due to separate reporting requirements, spin-offs result in greater information and 
transparency for a subsidiary that starts trading separately, and it is assumed that investors 
are attracted to such pure plays. Moreover, different investors have different preferences; 
they are heterogeneous. Therefore, separated divisions can attract different investor groups 
and thus increase the overall demand for the shares. Examples include preferences towards 
growth stocks vs. value stocks and the much related capital gains vs. dividends. These 
preferences stem mostly from the tax clientele effect, but other issues such as risk aversion 
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contribute as well. Information asymmetry hypothesis is presented among others in Vijh 
(2002) and Hulburt et al. (2002). 
 
2.1.3. Efficiency explanations 
 
Efficiency explanations cover several hypotheses that explain how spin-offs facilitate the 
improvement in the efficiency of the operations, investment decisions etc. of the 
organization. Below are brief descriptions of three of the most common efficiency 
hypotheses related to divestitures. 
 
Corporate Focus Hypothesis
 
Corporate focus hypothesis suggests that increased corporate focus allow managers to 
concentrate on the core operations because their attention is not diverted across many 
divisions that operate in very different industries. This in turn translates into more efficient 
operations and better performance, which create value. Corporate focus hypothesis one of 
the most well known explanations behind value creation through divestitures, and is well 
presented in e.g. John and Ofek (1995). 
 
Incentive Alignment Hypothesis
 
Spin-offs enable firms to offer stock-based compensation to subsidiary’s managers. This in 
turn is expected to motivate them to work more efficiently and exploit investment 
opportunities. Subsidiary managers cannot be offered such incentives because there are no 
separate subsidiary shares. If the managers’ compensation was tied to the stock performance 
of the parent, they might feel that they do not have enough control over it and lack the 
motivation to improve their performance. The reasoning behind incentive alignment 
hypothesis is well presented in Daley et al. (1997). 
 
Investment Efficiency 
 
If management is not doing a good job in replicating financial markets, capital allocation can 
be inefficient and a spin-off can increase the firm value through improved investment 
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opportunities. Spin-offs thus reduce the problem of cross-subsidization of poorly performing 
divisions. Investment efficiency is thoroughly dealt with in Allen et al. (1998). 
 
 
2.1.4. Other explanations 
 
There are a few other explanations or hypotheses that explain the logic behind value creation 
through spin-offs that do not fall into either efficiency or information category. These 
explanations come either from theoretical reasoning or empirical results from previous 
studies. 
 
Expropriation Hypothesis 
 
According to this hypothesis, the positive stock price reactions can be caused by wealth 
transfers from bondholders to stockholders. If that were the case, the value of the company 
would not change; the stockholder’s gain would merely be the bondholder’s loss. There are 
mixed results from the U.S. studies, but certainly expropriation cannot completely explain 
the value creation from spin-offs. Expropriation hypothesis is not feasibly testable in this 
study since bilateral bank loans instead of bonds are very common in Europe.  
 
Relative Size  
 
This explanation simply states that relatively larger spin-offs create more value and is mainly 
based on the results from earlier studies. Explanations for the relative size effect include 
efficiency improvements and information signalling. Intuitively, if spin-off is a mechanism 
by which company value is increased by getting rid of something that decreases value, then 
logically by getting rid of a larger proportion of this strain on value should increase the value 
of what is left more. Relative size as a source of value creation is supported in Schipper and 
Smith (1983), Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) and Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) 
among others. 
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Taxes and regulation 
 
The U.S. studies have found some effects on value created through spin-offs due to taxes or 
regulatory issues, but these are relatively irrelevant in Europe due to differences in the two 
markets. In the U.S. some spin-offs are taxable, and studies have found that these spin-offs 
create less value than those that are not taxed. Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) argue that 
in Europe spin-offs do not generally create tax problems, because it is possible to defer tax 
payments. Furthermore, in Germany and France, two of the central markets in Europe, it is 
not known in advance whether a spin-off will be taxed or not. The actions of the investors 
post-spin-off determine the total tax effect of a spin-off. For these reasons, taxes are not 
included in the analysis in this thesis. 
 
Geographical focus  
 
Geographical focus is increased when the spun-off division is foreign. Ex-ante, the value 
effect can be negative or positive (Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004)). Arguments in favour 
of a negative value effect include the reduced economies of scale in production, signalling of 
a poor previous decision and the relative disadvantage to competitors who do operate 
internationally. One of the arguments for a positive value effect is the reduced monitoring 
and coordination costs through reduced complexity. Another one is that the global 
diversification could have been done to reduce the managers’ own risk at the expense of the 
shareholders in the first place. Thus reversing this ill-advised decision increases value. 
Finally, also the possibility of cross-subsidisation of poor divisions may be reduced 
following an increase in geographical focus. The overall effect is naturally determined by the 
relative strengths of these various arguments. 
 
 
2.2. Empirical results on spin-offs 
 
This section covers the empirical evidence regarding value creation through spin-offs. I will 
first go through the announcement effects and long run stock performance following spin-
offs, after which I present evidence on the sources of these wealth effects. The section 
concludes with some evidence on the type of divestiture selected by managers. 
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2.2.1. Shareholder returns at announcement  
 
As mentioned already, the reported announcement returns following a spin-off have been 
positive, statistically significant and of the magnitude of around +3-4%. Table 1 below 
summarizes the announcement effects of corporate spin-offs from the most important 
previous studies. 
 
Table 1. Abnormal returns from spin-offs 
studies on abnormal returns resulting from spin-offs. All the 
mal return for parent shareholders at announcement, ranging from 
.2.2. Long run stock performance 
he long run stock performance after spin-offs has been studied much less than the 
Time Sample Event Parent
Research paper Period Size Window Return
Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) 1963-1980 55 (0,+1) 3.34 %
Hite and Owers (1983) 1963-1981 123 (-1,0) 3.30 %
Schipper and Smith (1983) 1963-1981 93 (-1,0) 2.84 %
Daley et al. (1997) 1975-1991 85 (-1,0) 3.40 %
Desai and Jain (1999) 1975-1991 143 (-1,+1) 3.84 %
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) 1979-1993 118 (-1,0) 3.15 %
Mulherin and Boone (2000) 1990-1999 106 (-1,+1) 4.51 %
Table 1 shows a summary of selected previous 
papers report a positive and significant abnor
2.84% to 4.51%. 
 
 
2
 
T
announcement effects. This is probably in part due to methodological difficulties. Another 
reason may be that it can be argued to be pointless, since assuming efficient markets, there 
should be no long run abnormal returns. However, the few papers that have studied this in 
the U.S. have found significant long run abnormal stock performance. Desai and Jain (1999) 
report a long run abnormal return for focus increasing spin-offs of 25.37% over 3 years after 
the spin-off. The result is significant at 5% level. Cusatis et al. (1993) studied the long run 
abnormal returns of spin-offs in conjunction with post spin-off takeover activity. They report 
a long run abnormal return of 20.0% over 24 months and 24.3% over 36 months for the 
entire sample of 146 spin-offs. Both results are significant at the 10% level. The subsample 
of spin-offs that were subsequently taken over provides even stronger results. The abnormal 
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return for the 24-month period was 62.3% and for the 36-month period 99.3%, both 
statistically significant at 1% level. They conclude that the abnormal long run performance is 
mainly caused by the post spin-off takeover activity and the related acquisition premium. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the only European study by Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) 
.2.3. Sources of wealth gains 
here remains very little uncertainty regarding the existence of positive abnormal returns 
ne common source of value creation in most studies is the relative size of the spin-off. Hite 
reported insignificant long run abnormal returns. The discrepancy between the results from 
Europe and the U.S. was explained by different levels of capital market efficiencies. The 
results of Cusatis et al. (1993) offer post spin-off takeover activity as a potential cause for 
the differing results. If takeovers of spun-off companies are more common in the U.S. than 
in Europe, this can explain the difference in long run abnormal returns. 
 
 
2
 
T
following spin-off announcements in the financial literature. However, the sources and 
reasons offered to this value creation come in many forms. The potential sources why spin-
offs might create value were presented in section 2.1., and here I outline the empirical 
findings regarding them. 
 
O
and Owers (1983), Miles and Rosenfeld (1983), Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) and 
Vijh (2002) all show highly significant size effect in value creation from divestitures. 
Another common source of wealth gains is the increase in focus. The spin-offs of unrelated 
subsidiaries result in significantly higher abnormal returns than do spin-offs of related 
subsidiaries. Table 2 below summarizes the results of selected papers regarding focus-
increasing divestitures, both spin-offs and equity carve-outs. A couple of points are worth 
mentioning here. First, unrelated spin-offs seem to create more value than related spin-offs, 
suggesting that focus increases value. Second, this difference is smaller with equity carve-
outs than with spin-offs. One already mentioned reason for this is that equity carve-outs 
involve a cash payment and can therefore be motivated by it rather than efficiency reasons. 
 
 24
Table 2. Related vs. unrelated divestitures 
studying the effect of related vs. unrelated divestitures on parent 
2-digit SIC code to identify whether a spin-off is from related or 
lth from bondholders to stockholders is not supported in any of the 
provement in efficiency and operating performance seem to contribute to the value 
lthough many papers have supported improved efficiency as a value driver in spin-offs, 
there are several studies that place more emphasis on the information asymmetry related 
Divestiture Time Related Related Unrelated Difference
Research paper Type Period Determined Return Return
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) Spin-off 1979-1993 2-digit SIC 1.86 % 3.59 % 1.73 %
Daley et al. (1997) Spin-off 1975-1991 2-digit SIC 1.60 % 4.50 % 2.90 %
Desai and Jain (1999) Spin-off 1975-1991 2-digit SIC 2.71 % 4.45 % 1.74 %
Boone (2000) Spin-off 1985-1990 2-digit SIC 0.85 % 4.07 % 3.22 %
Spin-off 1991-1996 2-digit SIC 3.29 % 4.82 % 1.53 %
Allen and McConnell (1998) Carve-out 1978-1993 2-digit SIC 6.56 % 5.83 % -0.73 %
Boone (2000) Carve-out 1985-1996 2-digit SIC 2.91 % 2.76 % -0.15 %
Vijh (2002) Carve-out 1980-1997 2-digit SIC 0.80 % 2.34 % 1.54 %
Hulburt et al. (2002) Carve-out 1981-1994 4-digit SIC 0.98 % 2.10 % 1.12 %
Table 2 shows the results of previous papers 
abnormal returns. Most of these papers use the 
unrelated industry. All papers except two (Allen and McConnell (1998) and Boone (2000)) report a positive 
difference between unrelated abnormal return and related abnormal return, suggesting that increasing focus 
creates value in spin-offs. 
 
xpropriation of weaE
previous papers. Therefore it seems that the value created to shareholders through spin-offs 
is real and not merely transferred from the bondholders of the company.  
 
Im
creation from spin-offs. Hulburt et al. (2002) studied the stock reactions of rival companies 
to announcements of equity carve-outs, and found that rival’s stocks experience negative 
abnormal returns indicating an improvement in the operating efficiency of the spin-off parent. 
They tested the efficiency and information hypotheses simultaneously. If the source of value 
creation was information asymmetry, they claimed that the rival stocks should react 
positively to an undervalued parent company’s announcement of a spin-off. Since the 
evidence was the opposite, they concluded that value is created through improved efficiency. 
John and Ofek (1995) and Desai and Jain (1999) also report improved operating 
performance of the parent company. Efficiency reasons as sources of value creation were 
also highlighted by Vijh (2002), who distinguished between the information and efficiency 
explanations. In addition, Hite and Owers (1983) argued that both the parent company and 
spun-off subsidiary can separately form more efficient contracts, based on their comparative 
advantages, and hence improve operating efficiency. 
 
A
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explanations. Habib et al. (1997) modelled an information-based explanation for spin-offs. 
They argue that as spin-offs create new companies and more securities are available, the 
price system becomes more informative. As a result, they claim, the investment decisions of 
managers improve and the information asymmetry between managers and investors declines. 
This in turn increases the value of individual securities. Following this logic, a spin-off 
announcement leads to positive abnormal returns. 
 
Another paper in favour of the information explanation is Krishnawami and Subramaniam 
999). They regress the abnormal returns following spin-off announcements against relative 
.2.4. Divestiture type choice 
l evidence on the determinants of the divestiture type chosen, 
amely between asset sales, equity carve-outs and spin-offs. Nanda (1991), Slovin et al. 
esented an asymmetric information hypothesis, which predicts that equity 
arve-outs are undertaken by companies with an undervalued parent and an overvalued 
 
(1
size, information asymmetry, industry relatedness and taxes. Although the relative size and 
focus are reported to relate positively to abnormal returns, the authors still place the most 
weight on the reduction of information asymmetry as a value driver. Another study 
supporting the information asymmetry hypothesis is that of Johnson et al. (1996). They 
studied the correlation between announcement returns and operating performance changes 
following spin-offs and report insignificant results. They conclude that since efficiency does 
not improve but value is created, the explanation must come from the reduction in 
information asymmetry. 
 
 
2
 
 
This section presents empirica
n
(1995), Powers (2001) and Rejman (2004) evaluated in their papers the choice of divestiture 
method between equity carve-out, spin-off and asset sale. I will now go through the findings 
of these papers. 
 
Nanda (1991) pr
c
subsidiary. She modelled the choice of divestiture type without using any empirical data and 
concluded that firms resorting to equity carve-outs are, on average, undervalued by the 
market. Her results thus support information hypothesis and rejects efficiency hypotheses. 
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Slovin et al. (1995) compared the information conveyed by the different divestiture methods 
by looking at the share price reactions of rivals to carve-out, spin-off and asset sale 
nnouncements. They found a negative rival stock price reaction to equity carve-outs, 
ts of the method chosen. He used the pre-divestiture data for parent 
nd subsidiary and found out that the primary factors affecting the choice of method were 
at bigger, less leveraged and more 
rofitable parents tend to carve out instead of spin off. Although he did not report evidence 
he sources of wealth gains from a particular 
ivestment, in this case a spin-off, remain unclear. 
a
positive to spin-offs and insignificant to asset sales, and they concluded that a carve-out is 
chosen when the managers believe outside investors are likely to price the new shares higher 
than managers’ perceived value. In other words, information explanation was supported; 
managers have an information advantage over investors and issue subsidiary equity, i.e. 
carve out, only when it is overvalued. These findings contradict the efficiency explanations 
of spin-off value creation, because a positive reaction of rivals to spin-offs conveys positive 
information about the industry. The spun off entity is undervalued and hence the whole 
industry is undervalued. Consequently, if mangers believe the divested unit is undervalued, 
they are reluctant to issue equity and go with a spin-off instead, a conclusion consistent with 
Nanda’s (1991) model. 
 
Powers (2001) studied a sample of 187 spin-offs, 204 sell-offs and 181 equity carve-outs to 
quantify the determinan
a
parent’s need for external capital and the quality of the subsidiary. Spin-offs were associated 
with better pre-divestiture performance and smaller leverage than asset sales or equity carve-
outs. Carved-out subsidiaries had better profitability and growth than spin-offs, which in turn 
were more profitable and had better growth than asset sales. The subsidiary’s relative 
profitability to its parent was also better in carve-outs than in asset sales or spin-offs. These 
results are consistent with those of Slovin et al. (1995). 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, Rejman (2004) studied the divestiture 
method choice in his master’s thesis. He concluded th
p
regarding under- or overvaluation of the subsidiary contributing to the method choice, his 
results are in line with the previous studies. 
 
These findings rather consistently support the information hypothesis in selecting an 
appropriate divestiture method, but still t
d
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3. Hypotheses 
 
 
 
This section presents the hypotheses employed in the thesis and the theoretical reasoning 
behind them. 
 
H1: Spin-off announcements result in positive abnormal returns to the 
shareholders of the parent company. 
 
The first hypothesis is based on the various value creation hypotheses, such as incentive 
alignment hypothesis, corporate focus hypothesis and information hypothesis. Incentive 
alignment hypothesis states that when a subsidiary starts trading separately, its managers’ 
can be compensated based on stock price performance and thus shareholders’ and managers’ 
incentives are better aligned. Corporate focus hypothesis suggests that increased corporate 
focus allow managers to concentrate on the core operations because their attention is not 
diverted across many divisions that operate in very different industries. This in turn 
translates into more efficient operations and better performance, which create value. 
Information hypothesis on the other hand, is based on the logic that spin-off decision 
presents new information to the market, makes the valuation of the separate firms more 
transparent and hence reduces the asymmetry of information between managers and 
investors. In addition to these theoretical explanations, the empirical results of the previous 
literature are almost unanimous in this respect. 
 
 
H2: Industry adjusted, long run abnormal stock returns following spin-offs are 
insignificantly different from zero. 
 
The second hypothesis is derived from the well-known Efficient Market Hypothesis, 
according to which the initial stock price reaction should capture the value effect of a spin-
off announcement entirely. This hypothesis is also supported by the results of Veld and 
Veld-Merkoulova (2004) with European data. Moreover, the fact that some U.S. studies have 
presented opposite results makes this an interesting hypothesis to test. 
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H3: Operating performance of the parent company improves following a spin-
off. 
is is based on the various efficiency hypotheses that are also supported by 
mpirical findings in the previous studies from the U.S.  H3 is also closely connected to H1; 
H1 states tha
creation is im hermore, it is feasible to assume that the 
pun-off assets are the ones that hinder the efficiency of the entire company. Thus, when 
erformance, they will not value the stock higher at the announcement. There’s also a clear 
nk between operating performance and value in general; companies that make profit are 
valued highe
Again, differ m the U.S. make this more interesting a 
ypothesis to test. 
 
This hypothes
e
t value is created through spin-offs and H3 states that one source of this value 
proving operating performance. Furt
s
these assets are removed and focus is diverted to those assets that are more suitable for the 
company as a whole, the efficiency of these remaining assets should improve. Following this 
logic, spin-offs should lead to more efficient operations that in turn explain the value created 
in the process. This relationship between value creation and improved efficiency is in fact 
the next hypothesis. 
 
 
H4: The abnormal return at announcement is positively related to the change 
in the operating performance of the parent company. 
 
The fourth hypothesis is again based on the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The logic here is 
that the improved operating performance is anticipated immediately and reflected in the 
stock price. Conversely, if the markets do not see any potential to improve operating 
p
li
r than those that do not. Therefore this logic should work on spin-offs as well.  
ing results from some studies fro
h
 
 
H5: Post spin-off takeover activity has power in explaining the long-term 
abnormal stock returns. 
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The fifth hypothesis is derived from empirical results as well as logical evaluation of the 
effect of tak . 
(1993) reported this effect in the U.S. Furthermore, sellers in takeovers tend to experience 
ignificant positive abnormal returns which naturally improves the performance of the spun 
eovers on seller’s returns and consequently long term returns. Cusatis et al
s
off companies that are eventually taken over. Assuming that the sample spun-off companies 
that are taken over are not initially undervalued by the amount of the average acquisition 
premium, their long run stock performance should exceed that of the rest of the market. 
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4. Data 
 
 
4.1. Retrieval process 
 
The data used in this study was collected from several sources. The spin-off events and 
company details such as SIC codes, tickers and SEDOL and CUSIP codes were taken from 
DC Platinum, financial statement information from Thomson OneBanker Worldscope 
atabase and the stock price information from Datastream. All this data was collected for the 
arks. The quotes used for benchmark stock market 
indices were the total return indices for individual countries.  
 
 
4.2. Sample characteristics 
 
 
The sample consists of European spin-offs over the period of January the 1st 1994 to June the 
30th 2006. A European spin-off is defined as a spin-off in which a European parent company 
spins off a subsidiary, which can be European or non-European. All European countries are 
taken in the sample, with the exception of formerly Socialist East-European countries. 
 
Spin-off events were retrieved from SDC Platinum International Mergers and Acquisitions 
database. The initial sample consisted of 330 spin-offs. Table 3 reports the annual and 
geographical distribution of the spin-offs in the sample. The row with the total number of 
observations shows that with 30%, the UK is rather heavily represented in the total sample 
(98 observations out of 330 come from the UK). Sweden with 15% and Germany and Italy 
with 9% representation each follow. The rest of the observations are distributed quite evenly 
between the other countries. Another point worth mentioning is the annual distribution of the 
spin-offs that is presented in Figure 1. Since mid-1990s the amount of spin-offs increased 
steadily and clearly peaked in 2000. After that the frequency of spin-offs declined until it 
again increased slightly towards the mid-2000s. We have to note that this figure is not 
complete, since in 2006 only those spin-offs that were announced before June 30th were 
involved.  
S
d
parents, spun-off subsidiaries and benchm
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In order to explain the annual variation in the amount of spin-offs we can look at the stock 
arket performance over the same period. Figure 2 below depicts the development of a 
SE EUR300, over 1994-2006. The shapes of the two diagrams are 
s that spin-off activity and stock market performance are indeed 
ositively correlated.  
m
European stock index, FT
very similar, and it seem
p
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A number of spin-offs had to be eliminated from the original sample for various reasons. The 
first reason is that a parent sometimes announced two or more spin-offs simultaneously, and 
since it is impossible to distinguish between the impacts of the different spin-offs on the 
parent stock price, these double records had to be eliminated. The amount of eliminated spin-
offs due to multiple simultaneous announcements was 39. The second reason is that 
ometimes a single spin-off was carried out by multiple parents. Again, the impact of a spin-
off on parent stock price would be impossible to detect in such a case and altogether three 
spin-offs had to be eliminated due to this. The third reason is that there was not enough 
information available on the parent company. For instance the spin-off of Barco 
Communications Systems that was announced in September 2000 showed the Kingdom of 
Belgium as the parent. Since it is not sure which the parent company really was, these spin-
offs were also eliminated. The amount of spin-offs taken out from the sample due to lack of 
information on the parent was 14. The fourth reason for elimination is that no stock price 
information was available in Datastream for the required period around the spin-off. Number 
of spin-offs eliminated because of this was 110. The final sample consists of 164 
observations. Out of these 164 spin-offs, 120 were completed, 27 still pending, nine 
withdrawn and eight had an unknown status at the time this study was done (October 2008). 
 
s
able 3. Sample observations by announcement year and parent home country 
1994 2 1 1 1 9
1995 4 1 1 1
1996 8 2 1 9
1997 11 1 1 3
1998 11 4 1 1 10 2
1999 6 3 5 4 3 2 4
2000 15 10 2 6 5 3 8
2001 10 1 3 6 4 0
2002 5 1 1
2003 5 2 1 5 1 2 4
2004 8 2 1 2 4 4 9
2005 5 5 2 3 4 2 2
2006 8 3 2 1 4 1 4
Total number of observations 98 31 12 31 51 23 2 0
- multiple announcements 8 2 2 3 5 2 2 9
- spin-off by multiple parents
- no stock price data available 38 7 6 9 14 11 0
- parent not known 5 2 1 3
Total sample 52 22 4 14 30 9 0 4
Completed 47 9 3 8 27 7 0
Year UK GER FRA ITA SWE NOR DEN FIN NL BL CH SP AUS IRE GRE CZ LUX POR HUN Total
1 1 1 1
1 8
2 1 23
1 1 18
3 1 33
2 4 2 2 1 3
6 1 4 1 1 4 5
2 2 1 1 3
1 8
1 3 1 1 1 1 2
3 2 1 1 1 2
2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 3
1 2 1 1 2
16 13 10 18 4 3 6 7 1 1 2 1 33
5 6 4 3
3 3
1 5 3 6 1 2 1 3 1 1 1 11
3 14
7 2 4 9 3 1 5 0 0 0 1 1 16
5 1 2 5 1 1 3 1 12  
een January 1Table 3 shows the distribution of European companies that announced a spin-off betw
ment year and home country of the parent company. The spin-off announcemen
Database. Spin-offs are eliminated for the following reasons: 1) double records of pa
2) spin-offs by multiple parents, 3) lack of information on the identity of the parent
UK for United Kingdom, GER for Germany, FRA for France, ITA for Italy, SWE for
BL for Belgium, CH for Switzerland, SP for Spain, AUS for Austria, IRE for the Re
POR for Portugal and HUN for Hungary. 
st 1994 and June 30th 2006. The observations are presented by announce-
ts and dates are identified from the SDC Platinum International Mergers and Acquisitions 
rent companies that announce a spin-off of two or more subsidiaries on the same date, 
 and 4) no stock price data available in Datastream. Countries are denoted as follows: 
 Sweden, NOR for Norway, DEN for Denmark, FIN for Finland, NL for Netherlands, 
public of Ireland, GRE for Greece, CZ for the Czech Republic, LUX for Luxembourg, 
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With a 32% weight, the UK is still heavily represented in the f fter the 
eliminations, as are Sweden (18%), Germany (13%) and Italy (9%), so the geographical 
distribution of the sample remained close to what it was in the orig ter the 
elimination, there were no observations from Denmark, Greece, r 
Luxembourg, and thus only 15 countries remained represented in the sample. 
 
Table 4 below presents the mean and median market values of parents and spin-off 
subsidiaries, their standard deviations and average relative size. As shown by the vast 
difference in the mean and median values, the sample is characterized b
the sizes of parents. The mean market value of parents is over € 10 b edian 
is only € 1.6 billion. The mean relative size of the spin-off to the parent is 16.57% and the 
median 27.54%, so on average, the parents in the sample are much larger than the 
subsidiaries they spin off. 
 
 
Table 4. Parent and subsidiary average market values 
 
Table 4 presents t verage market values in millions of euros for the parents and e 
average relative size he spin-off to parent. Both mean and median measures a re 
presented. The di s between means and medians are large, suggesting th  
parents in the sam in-offs are relatively small compared to parents, depending on t  average 
relative size of the -off ranges between 16.57 and 27.45 percent of the parent ma
 
 
Table 5 on the next page shows the industrial distribution of the sample. Altogether 36 
industries, classified by the 2-digit SIC code, are represented in the sam
is relatively even across industries. However, four industries clearly stand out with a 
relatively large representation. They are business services, chemical and allied products, 
investment and commodity firms, dealers, exchanges and real estate; mortgage bankers and 
brokers. These four industries make up more than 40% of the entire sam
observations.
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5. Methodology 
 
 
This section presents the m
calculate the announcem
abnorm
operational efficiency. An OLS regression m
ethodology employed in the thesis. Event study method is used to 
ent effects, benchmark index approach to find out the long-run 
al returns and industry-adjusted changes in return on assets to determine changes in 
odel is used to f inants of 
cumulative abnormal returns found from the event study. 
 
 
5.1. The event study method 
 
 
The announcement effects are calculated using a basic event study m mong 
others in Brown and Warner (1985). They present three approaches to calculating abnormal 
returns in an event study; mean adjusted return, market adjusted re arket 
model. I employ the OLS market model, which seems to be the most commonly used 
approach in event studies in the financial literature. 
 
In the market model, the first step is to define a normal return for each of the companies in 
the sample. A normal return is what is expected if no event took place, and is estimated over 
a so called estimation period, a “clean” period preceding the spin-off announcement. The 
estimation is done using the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression method over this 
estimation period, and is formulated as: 
 
titmiiti RR ,,,
ind the determ
ethod presented a
turn and the OLS m
εβα ++= ,                   (1) 
 
where tiR , is the expected return on day t on company i’s common stock. iα and iβ are the 
OLS estimates for the market model parameters and tmR , is the logar c return on the 
Datastream total return index of the company’s home market. ti,
ithmi
ε  is a residu
ed that stock returns 
al term with an 
expected value of zero. Logarithmic returns are used, since it is assum
are lognormally distributed. 
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The spin-off announcement date from SDC is used as the event date, day 0, for each event. 
tock price data is collected over the period (-220, +1) around the event date. The estimation 
eriod used is (-220,-21) and the event window used is (-1,+1) for the announcement effects. 
,,,,,
S
p
The methodology to calculate the long run abnormal returns is explained later in section 5.3. 
 
Now, for each company and each day in the event window the abnormal return is calculated 
using the following equation: 
 
tmiititititi RrRrAR βα −−=−= ,                    (2) 
y t on the company i’s stock. 
returns. The average abnormal return for 
ay t is generated from the following equation:  
 
where tir , is the actual return on da
 
For each day in the event window (-1,+1), an average abnormal return is calculated by 
averaging across N companies in the sample. The reasoning behind this is that individual 
stock returns are noisy, but this noise tends to cancel out when averaging across a large 
number of companies. Less noise naturally facilitates distinguishing the isolated impact of 
the event, in this case a spin-off announcement, on 
d
 
∑=
=
an event on returns, cumulative average abnormal 
turn (CAR) is calculated for the sample. This is done by cumulating the average abnormal 
returns over the event window: 
N
i
tit ARN
AR
1
,
1 ,                     (3) 
 
Finally, to capture the total impact of 
re
 
∑+
−=
=
1t
tARCAR                      (4) 
 
The t-test is used to define whether the cumulative abnormal returns are statistically different 
from zero. The testable null hypothesis is therefore that the abnormal return for each day over 
the event window is zero. 
1
Assuming independently and identically distributed abnormal 
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returns, the t-statistic for average abnormal return is calculated as follows (Brown and 
Warner, 1985): 
 
)(
~)1(
ARS
ARNt t− ,                     (5) 
 
where (N - 1) defines the degrees of freedom and )(ARS is the sample standard error of the 
ean of stock returns during the estimation period. 
 
he t-statistic for the cumulative abnormal return is the following: 
m
T
 
3)(
~)1( 1,1
ARS
CAR
Nt +−− ,                     (6) 
 
where 3 is a factor used in scaling the daily standard error for the event period (-1,+1) that 
is three days long in my study. 
 
 
5.2. Regression model 
 
ultivariate ordinary least squares regression model is used to find out the sources of the 
 variables are relative size, related industry dummy, 
turn on assets over a four-year period around 
 The regression equation is: 
 
321                     (7) 
 
 
A m
cumulative abnormal returns. CAR over the event window (-1,+1) is taken as the dependent 
variable and the independent
geographical focus dummy and the change in re
the spin-off.
eEROAINCREASb
GEOFOCUSbUSTRYRELATEDINDbZERELATIVESIbaCAR
++
+++=
4
 
where  RELATIVESIZE is the market capitalization of the spun off subsidiary over the 
market capitalization of the parent at the time of the announcement, 
 39
RELATEDINDUSTRY is a dummy that gets a value 1 if the spun off 
subsidiary is from a different industry than the parent and 0 otherwise, 
 
GEOFOCUS is a dummy that gets a value 1 if the spun off subsidiary is from
different country than the parent and 0 otherwise, and 
 
acts as a proxy for improvement in the 
operative efficiency. This variable is only used in the sample where I study the 
 
 
In addition to these v the model also contains year dummies as control
the first 12 years in the sample period and dummies for the most represented areas; 
candinavia, Germany and the UK.  
 and interpretation of the regression results, I also run 
nivariate regressions for each of the independent variables and check for possible 
ulticollinearity between different independent variables that might distort the results. The 
also change, depending on which sample is tested. For instance, 
e change in ROA can only be used in the regression equation testing the sample of 
ompleted spin-offs. 
alculating long run abnormal returns poses some methodological difficulties. One 
commonly accepted method is the matching firm approach of Barber and Lyon (1997), also 
used by Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004).  The criteria for selecting the tc
sually size, industry and market-to-book ratio. However, as the sample in this thesis covers 
own market i , I employ 
nother approach, presented by Desai and Jain (1999), where I benchmark the abnormal 
 a 
ROAINCREASE is the increase in the return on assets over two years before 
the spin-off to two years after it and 
completed spin-offs. 
ariables,  variables for 
S
 
In order to facilitate the analysis
u
m
independent variables will 
th
c
 
 
 
5.3. Long run abnormal returns 
 
 
C
 ma hing firm are 
u
various European markets, finding appropriate matching firms for each company from its 
s difficult and sometimes such a firm does not even exist. Therefore
a
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returns again
According to chmark 
approach provide very similar results, and therefore this method should be feasible for my 
study. The lo
the parent co  are the equity values of 
the parent and subsidiary at the end of the month of the announcement date. This method 
entirely captu
the reorganiz
 
There is a di cial literature whether equal-weighted or value-weighted 
returns shou  over the sample. Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue that equal-
eighted returns are more relevant from the point of view of an investor who wants to 
ealth effects that are experienced by investors in the 
arket. This point is illustrated in Brav et al. (2000). They present a hypothetical example 
t the sample performance is virtually zero. From the viewpoint of my 
udy, I prefer the analysis of equal-weighted returns. The reason for this is that I want to test 
hether a random spin-off will be associated with long run superior performance. Now I will 
rmal returns used in the study are calculated.  
st the FTSE EUR1ST 300E index that covers 300 large European companies. 
 Desai and Jain (1999), the matching firm approach and index ben
ng run returns are calculated as a weighted average of the abnormal returns of 
mpany and the spun-off subsidiary. The weights used
res the long run value effect of holding the stock of the parent company through 
ation process and over the entire calculation period. 
scussion in the finan
ld be used
w
predict the abnormal returns associated with a random event, in this case a spin-off. Fama 
(1998), on the other hand, argues that value-weighted returns should be studied, because they 
more accurately capture the total w
m
where the sample consists of 1000 firms, 999 of which have a $ 1 million market 
capitalization and one firm that has a $ 1001 million market capitalization. They then present 
a scenario where the 999 small firms all have underperformed by an equal percentage of 50% 
while the large firm has overperformed by 50%. Here it can be seen that an equal-weighted 
measure will indicate a severe mispricing (-50%), while a value-weighted measure will lead 
to the conclusion tha
st
w
explain how the equal-weighted abno
 
The abnormal returns are calculated from monthly stock prices, and then a measure called 
average holding period abnormal return (AHAR) is determined for several periods. The 
returns over a four-year period around the month of the spin-off announcement are used. The 
equation for calculating the average holding period abnormal return for a certain period is: 
 
T
AR
AHAR
T
t
t
t
∑
== 1 ,                     (8) 
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where T is the number of observations during that period. 
 
The statistical significance of the average holding period abnormal return ( tAHAR ) for any 
given holding period T (for example, 12 months) is determined using the t-statistic which is 
computed as: 
 
)(
)1(
T
T
AHARS
AHARN =− ,                     (9) 
ed from 
son One Banker. Industries are defined here based on the 4-digit SIC codes. 
of 
perating earnings to total assets. ROA is suitable for the purpose of my study for several 
reasons. First, taking operating earnings isolates interest and tax effects as well as one-time 
charges, thus resulting in the change in the operational efficienc alone. Sec
t
 
where )( TAHARS is the standard error of TAHAR . 
 
 
 
5.4. Change in operating performance 
 
 
Here I follow the methodology of Daley et al. (1997) and Healy et al. (1992). The idea is to 
compare the changes in the operating performance measures of the portfolio of parent and 
subsidiary with those of the pre-spin-off figures of the parent company and benchmark them 
to the industry median measures. The calculated abnormal value is the change in the specific 
measure of the firm performance minus the change in the industry median of this measure. 
Doing this controls for the industry specific effects and should only show the company 
specific changes due to the spin-off. As pointed out in the previous section, finding 
individual industry peers for European companies is tricky and hence instead of finding 
individual peer companies for analysis, I use industry median figures retriev
Thom
 
More precisely, I examine the accounting performance for the sample firms in each of the 
five years centred around the announcement year, i.e. years -2,+2 relative to the spin-off. The 
performance measure employed here is the return on assets (ROA), defined as the ratio 
o
y ond, ROA is 
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made up of profit margin and asset turnover and captures efficiency improvements in both 
ther the possible improvement in 
perational efficiency is reflected in profit margin or asset turnover, or both, using ROA is 
 changes in ROA are calculated using three steps (Daley et al. (1997)). First, 
e adjusted return on assets for firm j in time t is calculated as: 
 
is t ets for  j in time t and is the median 
OA of the industry in time t. This measure is called the industry adjusted ROA. Next, the 
hange in the industry adjusted ROA is calculated as the difference between post-spin-off 
pany: 
these measures. Since it is not known in advance, whe
o
convenient since it captures both.  
 
The abnormal
th
tjtjtj IROAROAAROA ,,, −= ,                  (10) 
 
where he actual return on ass firmtjROA ,  tjIROA ,
R
c
AROA and pre-spin-off AROA for each spin-off com
 
prejpostjj AROAAROAAROA ,, −=                   (11) ∆
 
I calculate a single test value for each spin-off company for the change in adjusted ROA, or 
AROA∆ . This is done by comparing the average AROA over two years before the spin-off to 
the average AROA over two years after the spin-off. In addition, I calculate the change in 
AROA for each year over the five-year period (-2,+2 years around the spin-off). 
 
The measure used to detect abnormal operating performance in the sample is the median 
change in the adjusted return on assets, and is calculated as: 
 
)( jAROAmedianAROA ∆=∆                   (12) 
 
Median, rather than mean, is used because it is not affected by extremes and is thus more 
suitable a measure for detecting abnormal operating performance in the sample. However, in 
order to check the robustness of the results, I report the mean values together with the median 
values. 
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Again, the t-statistic to test for statistical significance is: 
 
)(
)1(
AROAS
AROANt ∆
∆=− ,                   (13) 
 
where )( AROAS ∆  is the standard error of the change in adjusted returns on assets. 
 
 44
6. Empirical results 
 
 
In this section I present the empirical results of the thesis. First I wi  show the a
e shareholders of the parent company caused by spin-offs. Then I will present the 
e spin-off 
nnouncement month and finally go over the sources of these abnormal returns, for both the 
announcement effects and the long run abnormal returns. Section 6.2. presents the results 
regarding the increase in the operating performance of the business entity over five years 
around the spin-off announcement. Finally I conclude this section with an interpretation part, 
where I compare the obtained results with the hypotheses presented in section 3 and with the 
results from previous studies presented in section 2. 
 
 
6.1. Stock market reactions 
 
 
 
6.1.1. Announcement effects 
 
 
This section presents the cumulative abnormal returns to parent shareholders following a 
spin-off announcement. The results were obtained by conducting an event study with market 
model approach and an event window of (-1,+1) and an estimation period of (-220,-21). 
Table 6 below shows the results for the entire sample as well as for a few selected subgroups; 
completed spin-offs, spin-offs from a non-related industry and spin-offs from a related 
industry as well as results for four of the most represented countries, the UK, Germany, 
Sweden and Italy. The first column shows the sample in question, the second column shows 
the number of observations in that sample, the third column shows the average cumulative 
abnormal return over the sample, the fourth column shows the t-stat of the CAR and the last 
column shows the statistical significance of the result; one asterisk meaning significance at 
the 10% level, two asterisks 5% level and three asterisks 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
ll nnouncement 
effects on th
results regarding the long run abnormal returns over a four-year period around th
a
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Table 6. Announcement effects following spin-offs 
able 6 presents the event study results for the announcement effects of spin-off announcements. The event 
indow used for calculating the cumulative abnormal returns was (-1,+1). The results are presented separately 
bsamples (completed, non-related industry and related industry) and for 
, Germany, Sweden and Italy. The CAR for the entire sample is +1.83% 
d significant at the 1% level. The CAR for completed sample of +1.92% and for non-related sample of 
2.38% are also significant at the 1% level. The only subsample that does not show significant results is the 
lated industry, suggesting that the spin-offs that do not increase industrial focus do not create abnormal 
non-related industry sample and the related industry sample is calculated as 
% level. The results for the UK, Germany, Sweden and Italy are all also 
ositive and significant, and do not differ substantially from one another. CAR for the UK sample is +2.83%, 
r Germany +2.10%, for Sweden +1.93% and for Italy +1.64%, all statistically significant at 1% level. The 
al 
turn is +1.92%, also significant at the 1% level. The two remaining subsamples, non-
lated and related industries, show the effect of increased industry focus on the value 
creation from spin-offs. The sample labelled non-related industry consists of those 
companies where the spun-off subsidiary is from the different industry than the parent, 
3.11 % 5.2 ***
 
Sample Number of observations CAR t-stat Significance
All 164 1.83 % 6.6 ***
Sub-samples
Completed 120 1.92 % 9.3 ***
Non-related industry 99 2.38 % 10.5 ***
Related industry 65 1.00 % 0.1
   Difference 1.38 % 3.8 ***
Selected countries
UK 52 1.32 % 4.2 ***
Germany 22 0.43 % 0.9 ***
Sweden 30
Italy 14
2.53 % 6.2 ***
T
w
for the entire sample, three different su
four most represented countries, the UK
an
+
re
returns. The difference between the 
ell and is 1,38%, significant at 1w
p
fo
statistical significance is represented using asterisks in the last column; * means significance at 10% level, ** 
5% level and *** 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
The first row of table 6 shows that the cumulative abnormal return for the parent 
shareholders is a positive +1.83% in the entire sample of 164 spin-offs. The t-statistic is 6.6 
meaning that the result is statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, European spin-offs 
between 1994 and 2006 increase the wealth of parent shareholders and based on my sample 
the amount of this wealth creation is +1.83% on average. The result is consistent with 
previous studies that also conclude that spin-offs create value for parent shareholders.  
 
The result is similar also for the subsample of completed spin-offs. The cumulative abnorm
re
re
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resulting in increased industrial focus. This sample shows an average cumulative abnormal 
return of +2.38%, significant at the 1% level. The sample of related industry spin-offs also 
provides positive CARs of 1.00%. This result, however, is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. I also checked the statistical significance of the difference of these two 
subsamples. With a t-statistic of 3,8 the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Based on these two results it can be concluded that spin-offs resulting in industrial focus 
create value for parent shareholders whereas spin-offs that do not increase industrial focus do 
not. 
 
The results are also consistent over the selected countries. The average cumulative abnormal 
return for the UK spin-offs is +2.83%, for German spin-offs +2.10%, for Swedish spin-offs 
+1.93% and for Italian spin-offs +1.64%, all statistically significant at the 1% level. These 
sults suggest that European spin-offs create value to parent shareholders regardless of the 
s were then benchmarked against the FTSE 
ding period abnormal return was calculated for 
ent, except the one from 24 months before 
 
statistic is -2.6 meaning that the result is statistically significant at the 1% level. The results 
re
parent country. 
 
 
6.1.2. Long run abnormal returns 
 
Long run abnormal returns following spin-offs were measured for the portfolio consisting of 
the parent and subsidiary shares that were weighted by their market values at the end of the 
ent. The monthly returnmonth of the announcem
EUR1ST 300 equity index and the average hol
selected periods around the announcement. Table 7 below presents the results. The first 
column shows the selected periods, the second column the average holding period abnormal 
return and the t-statistic is shown next to it. Both median and mean results are presented in 
the table. 
 
The median results for average holding period abnormal returns are negative for all the 
selected periods around the announcem
announcement to 12 months before the announcement. However, none of these returns are 
statistically significant. The mean results put more emphasis on the extreme values and they
do show statistically significant results. The mean holding period abnormal return from 
announcement month (EX) to 12 months after announcement is a negative 18.78%. The t-
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for the period from announcement to 24 months after announcement are very similar. The 
average holding period abnormal return over that period is a negative 24.75%, also 
significant at 1% level. Also the entire period of 24 months before the announcement to 24 
months after it provide similar results. The mean holding period abnormal return is a 
negative 22.58% with a t-statistic of -2.1, again significant at the 1% level. 
 
Since the results between median and mean results differ so strongly, it can be concluded that 
the mean results are driven by extreme negative observations. When median results are used, 
it can be concluded that the long run stock performance does not improve after a spin-off. If 
nything, it seems to worsen. However, the median observations do not provide statistical 
ent of median long run cumulative abnormal returns is presented in Figure 3 
 -24 to EX -12 0.55 % 0.1 EX -24 to EX -12 -2.85 % -0.6
-0.8 EX -12 to EX 2.23 % 0.4
-0.7 EX to EX +12 -18.78 % -2.6 ***
 +12 to EX +24 -2.02 % -0.4 EX +12 to EX +24 -3.77 % -0.7
a
significance to these results. 
 
 
Table 7. Long run abnormal performance 
 
Median results Mean results
Period AHAR t-stat Period AHAR t-stat
EX
EX -12 to EX -4.52 %
EX to EX +12 -5.33 %
Table 7 shows the average holding period abnormal returns for the portfolio of parent and spin-off stocks. 
Equal-weighted returns are used instead of value-weighted returns, because they capture the long-run abnormal 
return of a random event, spin-off in this case, better than value-weighted returns. The first column shows the 
period over which the average holding period abnormal return is calculated, next two columns show the AHAR 
and related t-statistic. Left hand side of the table shows the median results and the right hand side shows the 
mean results. Both mean and median AHARs are negative in most of the periods. None of the median returns 
are statistically significant at conventional levels. The mean AHARs for periods EX to 12 months, EX to 24 
months and -24 to 24 months are negative and all statistically significant at 1% level. 
 
EX -6 to EX +6 -3.33 % -0.5 EX -6 to EX +6 -11.30 % -1.7 *
EX to EX +24 -8.84 % -0.9 EX to EX +24 -24.75 % -2.5 ***
EX -24 to EX -2.55 % -0.3 EX -24 to EX 0.81 % 0.1
EX -24 to EX +24 -10.94 % -1.0 EX -24 to EX +24 -22.58 % -2.1 ***
EX
 
The developm
below. The graph is drawn based on median monthly abnormal returns. Although the results 
are not statistically significant, it can be seen from the graph how the cumulative abnormal 
return stays near zero towards the announcement and declines quite steadily after it. 
Therefore it can be concluded that the long run stock performance does not improve 
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following spin-offs, as documented by several previous studies from the U.S. More 
interpretation on these results will follow in section 6.3. 
 
Figure 3. Long run cumulative abnormal returns after spin-offs 
 
Figure 3. Long run cumulative abnormal returns after spin-offs
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Figure 3 depicts the development of long run cumulative abnormal returns from monthly observations over a 
four-year period around spin-off announcement. Each monthly abnormal return is calculated as the difference 
between the raw return on a portfolio of parent and subsidiary, weighted by the market capitalizations at the end 
of the month of announcement, and the raw return on FTSE EUR1ST 300, a European equity index that covers 
300 large European companies. 
 
 
 
6.1.2. Sources of abnormal returns 
e results regarding the long run abnormal returns, because previous U.S. studies have 
ported that many of the spin-offs were subsequently taken over after spin-offs and that this 
 
Evidence on the sources of abnormal returns at announcement is derived from the results of 
the different regression models. This section presents the results of the various regressions 
explaining the cumulative abnormal returns around spin-off announcement. I also examined 
the takeover activity during the two-year period following the announcement that can explain 
th
re
has explained the positive long run abnormal returns. 
 
Table 8 below shows the regression results for the entire sample of 164 spin-offs. There are 
four different models in Table 8. There is the multivariate model with industrial focus, 
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relative size and geographic focus as explanatory variables and also three univariate models 
where one of these explanatory variables is used in turn in each of the models. The table also 
shows the number of observations, R square and adjusted R square for each of the models. 
ear dummies as well as three most represented areas, Scandinavia, Germany and the UK, 
All four models present similar results. The only independent variable capable of explaining 
the cumulative abnormal returns in the tests is the relative size of the spin-off. This occurs in 
both the multivariate and univariate models. The t-statistic for relative size in the multivariate 
model is 2.4 and represents statistical significance at the 5% level and the t-statistic in the 
univariate model is 2.6, representing statistical significance at the 1% level. Neither industrial 
focus nor geographical focus can explain cumulative abnormal returns at statistically 
significant levels in any of the models.  
 
Y
are used as control variables in each model. 
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Table 8. Regression of abnormal returns for the entire sample 
 
Independent variable is CAR
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -0.008 -0.002 -0.004 0.003
-0.6 -0.2 -0.4 0.3
Industrial focus 0.010
0.9
0.014
Table 8 presents the regression results of cumulative abnormal returns for the entire sample of 164 spin-offs. 
The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return and independent variables used are industrial focus, 
relative size of the spin-off and geographic focus. Year dummies and dummies for most represented areas are 
used as control variables. The first column shows the variable in question, and the next four columns contain 
different models. Model (1) is the multivariate model with all independent variables. Models (2) to (4) are 
univariate models for relative size, industrial focus and geographic focus. The main result drawn from all the 
models is that the relative size of the spin-off is positively and significantly at 1% level related to cumulative 
abnormal returns, while all the other explanatory variables fail to show a relationship with any conventional 
statistical significance levels. 
 
 
Both multivariate (model 1) and univariate (model 3) models show a slight positive 
relationship between industrial focus and cumulative abnormal returns, but these results are 
not statistically significant at conventional levels (t-statistics 0.9 and 1.2). However, as was 
mentioned in section 6.1.1., when the sample was divided into two subsamples based on 
whether the spin-off resulted in industrial focus or not, the focus increasing sample provided 
significant positive CARs while the non-focus increasing sample did not. The difference 
between the two subsamples was also statistically significant at the 1% level. Therefore, the 
1.2
elative size 0.066 0.069
1.0 1.7 * 1.7 *
ear dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 164 164 164 164
R square 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.02
Adjusted R square 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00
R
2.4 ** 2.6 ***
Geographic focus 0.000 0.000
0.0 0.0
Scandinavia 0.011 0.012 0.014 0.016
0.8 0.8 1.0 1.1
Germany 0.024 0.022 0.020 0.017
1.3 1.2 1.1 0.9
The UK 0.014 0.014 0.024 0.024
0.9
Y
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evidence on the effect of increasing industry focus on value created through spin-offs is not 
conclusive.  
 
Increase in geographic focus, defined as a spin-off where parent spins off a subsidiary that is 
from a different country, shows virtually no relationship with cumulative abnormal returns. 
This result is naturally not statistically significant as can be observed from the t-statistics of -
0.0 in both the multivariate model and the univariate model. 
 
One point worth mentioning about the models is their relatively low explanatory power. The 
adjusted R square of the multivariate model is only 0.03. On the other hand, this type of 
result was expected in the sense that also previous literature has shown consistent and 
significant CARs following spin-offs, but the sources offered have varied across samples, 
methods and studies. Therefore, financial literature still lacks a well functioning model to 
explain value creation through spin-offs. 
 
In addition to regressing cumulative abnormal returns of the entire sample, I also ran separate 
regressions for the completed sample. The sample of completed spin-offs allows introducing 
the change in operating performance into the model. This would not be sensible in the 
sample of all spin-offs since if the spin-off is not completed, its effects on the operating 
 in return on assets is introduced as a new independent 
ariable. The results are very similar to those obtained for the entire sample. Relative size of 
performance must be negligible. Furthermore, separate operating performance measures 
would not be available for spin-offs that have not been completed. 
 
Table 9 presents the regression results for the completed sample. The models are the same as 
with the sample of all spin-offs, with the exception that now the sample consists of the 120 
ompleted spin-offs and the changec
v
the spin-off is still the only variable that is statistically significantly related to cumulative 
abnormal returns. The new variable, change in return on assets, is slightly negatively related 
to abnormal returns, although this relationship is far from being statistically significant at any 
conventional levels (t-statistic -0.3). The implications of this result, however, are interesting 
and are discussed in section 6.3. The explanatory power of the model increased slightly with 
the introduction of change in return on assets as an independent variable. The adjusted R 
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square of model (1) is 0.05, which is still relatively low indicating that variables other than 
the ones included here could explain the cumulative abnormal returns. 
fs. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return and independent variables used are industrial 
cus, relative size of the spin-off, geographic focus and change in industry-adjusted return on assets. Year 
correlations between any of the variables are very modest, and hence my results and 
significance levels are not likely to be affected by adverse effects of multicollinearity. Also 
(4) (5)
0.038 0.036
-0.4 1.1 0.5 1.5 1.4
0.010 0.012 0.013 0.013
0.6 0.6 0.8 0.7
ermany 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.014 0.012
 
Table 9. Regression of abnormal returns for the completed sample 
Independent variable is CAR
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Intercept -0.013 0.029 0.004
Industrial focus 0.013 0.018
1.0 1.4
Relative size 0.077 0.081
2.8 *** 3.2 ***
Geographic focus 0.006 -0.008
0.3 -0.3
Change in ROA -0.030 -0.077
-0.3 -0.7
Scandinavia 0.009
0.5
Table 9 presents the regression results for cumulative abnormal returns for the 
0.5 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.8
The UK 0.011 0.010 0.019 0.020 0.018
0.6 0.6 1.2 1.3 0.9
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 120 120 120 120 120
R square 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.14 0.14
Adjusted R square 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.03
G
sample of 120 completed spin-
of
fo
dummies and dummies for most represented areas are used as control variables. The first column shows the 
variable in question, and the next four columns contain different models. Model (1) is the multivariate model 
with all independent variables. Models (2) to (5) are univariate models for industrial focus, relative size, 
geographic focus and change in industry-adjusted return on assets. The main result drawn from all the models is 
that the relative size of the spin-off is positively and significantly at 1% level related to cumulative abnormal 
returns, while all the other explanatory variables fail to show a relationship with any conventional statistical 
significance levels. 
 
 
If the independent variables are strongly correlated, i.e. there is multicollinearity between the 
variables, it is possible that the results and t-statistics can be biased. To test for 
multicollinearity, I calculated the correlations between each of the independent variables 
used. The results are presented in table 10. From the results it can be seen that the 
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the fact that the results were very similar between multivariate and univariate regression 
models confirms that the results from the multivariate model are not excessively distorted by 
ulticollinearity. 
 
Table 10. Correlation matrix for independent variables 
results show that there is not excessive multicollinearity between the variables that would distort the results 
obtained from the multivariate regression models. 
 
 
Cusatis et al. (1993) reported that subsequent takeover activity of spin-offs significantly 
increased the long run abnormal returns and that the acquisition premiums paid were in fact 
the decisive factor in determining the long run abnormal returns. They also reported that 
takeover activity of spin-offs was strong in the U.S. To check the effect of takeover activity 
in my European sample I determined the amount of spin-offs or parents in the completed 
sample that were taken over during the two-year period following the announcement. There 
were only 13 such observations in my sample. Therefore, it is not sensible to calculate the 
long run abnormal returns for a sample of only 13 observations. But one conclusion can be 
er in Europe between 1994 and 
.2. Operating performance changes 
Relative size Industry focus Geofocus ROA change
Relative size 1 0.159 -0.046 -0.069
Industry focus 1 -0.046 -0.055
Geofocus 1 0.100
ROA change 1
m
Table 10 presents the correlation matrix for all the independent variables used in the regression models. The 
drawn; takeover activity following spin-offs was much low
2006 than it has been in the U.S. studies. Second, the long run abnormal returns in my 
sample were much lower than those in the Cusatis et al. (1993) suggesting that it can be the 
difference in takeover activity between the markets that contribute to the differing results as 
well. I will provide a more thorough analysis of the results in section 6.3. 
 
 
 
6
 
 
This section presents the results on the operating performance changes, measured as the 
change in the industry adjusted return on assets. The sample consists of 45 completed spin-
offs for which data for both earnings from operations and total assets was available in 
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Thomson OneBanker Worldscope database for the five years around each spin-off. Table 11 
below shows the results regarding changes in operating performance. I concentrate my 
analysis on the median results, since mean results are affected by extreme observations. Both 
median and mean results are still presented for several periods, with the associated t-statistics 
and significance levels. The last column titled “-2Y – 2Y” is the main measure used to 
etermine whether operating performance increases through the reorganization process of a 
spin-off. The measure is calculated as the difference between the average change in return on 
assets over two years after the spin-off and that over two years before the spin-off. This 
measure is also used as an explanatory variable in the regression model that explains the 
cumulative abnormal returns in the sample of completed spin-offs. 
 
in return on assets are mainly positive. Only 
e negative change in return on assets for the period -1Y – 0Y. The changes in return on 
ssets are significant in only two periods out of six. The 2.94% increase in return on assets 
d
As can be seen from Table 11, the mean changes 
one period, the year preceding the spin-off announcement, shows a negative change in the 
return on assets. However, most of these measures are not statistically significant, including 
th
a
over the one-year period starting two years before the announcement (t-statistic 1.7) is 
significant at the 10% level. The mean result for the increase in the two-year average return 
on assets, shown in the last column in table 11, is an increase of 2.70% and with a t-statistic 
of 1.7 is also statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
The median changes in return on assets are also mainly positive. Only the one-year period 
following the spin-off announcement shows a negative change in return on assets. However, 
this is not statistically significant and neither are any of the results over the other periods. 
Therefore it seems that the mean results are driven by extreme positive observations and 
when the medians are used, there is no statistically significant improvement in operating 
efficiency caused by spin-offs. 
 
 55
Table 11. Operating performance changes around spin-off year 
 
Table 11 shows the results of the operating performance changes around spin-off events. The sample consisted 
of 45 completed spin-offs for which data of both earnings from operations and total assets was available in 
Thomson OneBanker Worldscope database for the years around the spin-off. The measure of performance 
change is the change in return on assets for each year, adjusted for industry medians. The last column titled “-
2Y – 2Y shows the aggregate change in adjusted ROA and is calculated as the average change in ROA over two 
years after the spin-off less the average change in ROA over two years before the spin-off. The year of the spin-
off is excluded. As can be seen from the last column, both the median and the mean change is positive, however, 
their statistical significance is weak; the mean change is statistically significant at the 10% level while the 
median change is not significant at conventional levels. 
 
Year -3Y-2Y -2Y-1Y -1Y-0Y 0Y-1Y 1Y-2Y -2Y - 2Y
Median 0.32 % 0.21 % 0.27 % -0.52 % 0.24 % 0.94 %
t-stat 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.4 0.3 0.6
Mean 1.53 % 2.94 % -0.49 % 1.41 % 0.62 % 2.70 %
t-stat 0.7 1.7 * -0.3 1.0 0.7 1.7 *
 
 
6.3. Interpretation of the results 
 
In this section I analyse the results on value creation through spin-offs. This section starts by 
briefly reviewing the main results obtained. Then I will restate the hypotheses introduced in 
section 3, compare the results to them and see whether each hypothesis gets rejected on 
statistical grounds or not. I conclude this section by comparing and contrasting my findings 
with previous literature and by presenting general implications of the results. 
 
Table 12 below presents a summary of results on announcement effects, long run abnormal 
ods post-spin-off and pre-spin-off. 
returns and changes in operating performance. The signs and t-statistics for the regression 
coefficients are also presented, both for the entire sample and the sample of completed spin-
offs. Long run return presented is the cumulative abnormal return over the 24-month period 
starting from the announcement month. The measure for the change in operating 
performance is the change in industry-adjusted return on assets that is the difference between 
the averages of the two-year peri
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Table 12. Summary of results 
 
hat measure, either 
he t-statistic of the 
rresponding result, and finally the last column shows the statistical significance. If the result is statistically 
gnificant at least at 10% level, then the column shows “Yes”, otherwise “No”. The asterisks after “Yes” show 
H1: Spin-off announcements result in positive abnormal returns to the 
shareholders of the parent company. 
 
  Related industry sample 1.00 % 0.1 No
- 0.0 No
ompleted sample
  Relative size + 2.8 Yes / ***
+ 1.0 No
+ 0.3 No
  Increase in ROA - -0.3 No
Measure Result t-statistic Significance
Announcement CAR
   Entire sample 1.83 % 6.6 Yes / ***
   Completed sample 1.92 % 9.3 Yes / ***
   Non-related industry sample 2.38 % 10.5 Yes / ***
 
       Difference 1.38 % 3.8 Yes / ***
Regression coefficients
Entire sample
   Relative size + 2.4 Yes / **
   Industry focus + 0.9 No
   Geographic focus
C
 
   Industry focus
   Geographic focus
Table 12 presents a summary of results from the Thesis. All results in the table are presented and explained in 
sections 6.1 and 6.2. The first column shows the measure, the second column the result for t
a numeric value or in the case of regression coefficients, direction. The third column shows t
Long run abnormal return, 0-24mths -8.84% -0.9 No
Change in operating performance 0.94 % 0.6 No
 
co
si
the level of statistical significance; one asterisk means 10% level, two asterisks mean 5% level and three 
asterisks mean 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
I will now restate the hypotheses presented in section 3 and refer to Table 12 as I determine 
whether the results support each hypothesis or not. The first hypothesis is related to the 
announcement effects of spin-offs and is stated as: 
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Cumulative abnormal return over the event window (-1,+1) is a positive 1.83% as can be 
seen from the first row in Table 12. With a t-statistic of 6.6 the result is statistically 
significant at the 1% level and thus H1 is not rejected. Based on empirical evidence on 
European spin-offs, the spin-off announcements result in positive abnormal returns to the 
shareholders of the parent company. 
 
This result is consistent with most of the previous studies, both in the U.S. and in Europe. 
Spin-off studies in the U.S. have reported positive and significant announcement effects 
ranging from 2.8% to 4.5%, depending on the sample used, to the shareholders in the parent 
company. Similarly, previous European studies have reported positive and significant 
announcement effects ranging from 0.5% to 3.3% again depending on the sample used. My 
result falls into this range as well. The magnitude of the effects in the U.S. studies seems to 
be larger than that in the European studies. However, statistical significance of this difference 
as well as the reasons behind it are not analysed in this context. 
 
The second hypothesis deals with the long run abnormal returns on the combination of the 
parent and the spun-off subsidiary. It is stated as: 
 
H2: Industry adjusted, long run abnormal stock returns following spin-offs are 
insignificantly different from zero. 
nsible in the presence of efficient markets. Since the announcement effects are positive and 
atistically significant while long run abnormal returns are insignificant, it can be concluded 
 
Veld and Ve
find insignifi ing spin-off announcements and conclude 
 
As can be seen from the penultimate row in Table 12, the median long run abnormal return 
over the two-year period following a spin-off announcement is a negative 8.84%. However, 
with a t-statistic of -0.9 this result is not statistically significant at any conventional level. 
This in turn means that H2 cannot be rejected based on empirical evidence. This result is 
se
st
that the value effects of spin-offs are reflected in the stock price at announcement and there 
are no abnormal returns in the subsequent periods. This evidence also supports the efficient 
market hypothesis. 
ld-Merkoulova (2004) report similar results for European spin-offs. They also 
cant long run abnormal returns follow
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that the effects are already captured at announcement. However, results from the U.S. differ 
ver 36 months for the entire sample of 146 spin-offs. 
oth results are significant at the 10% level. The subsample of spin-offs that were 
tested this is the Master’s Thesis by Vainio (2007). He evaluated the 
hange in return on capital employed and found insignificant results for his sample. On the 
other hand, studies from the U.S. have reported improved operating performance following 
quite substantially. Desai and Jain (1999) report long run abnormal returns for focus 
increasing spin-offs of 25.37% over 3 years after the spin-off, a result that is significant at the 
5% level. Cusatis et al. (1993) studied the long run abnormal returns of spin-offs in 
conjunction with post spin-off takeover activity. They report a long run abnormal return of 
20.0% over 24 months and 24.3% o
B
subsequently taken over provides even stronger results. The abnormal return for the 24 
month period was 62.3% and for the 36 month period 99.3%, both statistically significant at 
the 1% level. They conclude that the abnormal long run performance is mainly caused by the 
post spin-off takeover activity and the related acquisition premium. Veld and Veld-
Merkoulova (2004) on the other hand, suggested that the difference between European and 
U.S. results stem from differences in the efficiencies of the two markets. That is a possibility 
that cannot be ruled out based on my results. It is also a possibility that is very difficult to 
verify.  
 
The third hypothesis assumes that operating efficiency increases as a result of a spin-off. It is 
stated as: 
 
H3: Operating performance of the parent company improves following a spin-
off. 
 
The increase in operating performance is stated in the last row of Table 12, and is measured 
as the change in the industry-adjusted return on assets post spin-off versus pre spin-off. I 
report an increase in this measure in the amount of 0.94 percentage points. However, as 
becomes evident from the t-statistic of 0.6, this result is not statistically significant. Therefore, 
I must conclude that empirical evidence does not support H3 and it gets rejected. Spin-offs in 
Europe do not result in improved operating performance. 
 
Again, previous studies have found both similar and differing results. The only European 
study that has also 
c
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spin-offs. John and Ofek (1995) compared a measure of EBITD-to-sales of divesting parent 
to that of industry median and reported a statistically significant improvement in operating 
performance following asset sales. Similar results were reported in Desai and Jain (1999). 
They reported positive change in the measure of operating cash flow to assets as well as a 
positive relationship between this measure and the stock market performance at 
announcement and in the long run. It is worth mentioning at this point that my sample 
consisted of only 45 observations, which can in part explain the positive but insignificant 
results. The significance level could have improved with a larger sample. 
 
It still seems that in the U.S. operating performance improves after spin-offs while in Europe 
it does not. However, it remains unclear why the results differ in this respect. Therefore, 
future research could be directed towards explaining this difference by taking a sample from 
both markets and evaluating which variables, if any, cause this difference.  
 
The fourth hypothesis is closely linked to H3, and is stated as: 
 
H4: The abnormal return at announcement is positively related to the change 
in the operating performance of the parent company. 
sion coefficient of increase in ROA in the model explaining cumulative abnormal 
turns at announcement is negative, albeit statistically insignificant. Thus change in 
operating per . 
The conclusion is similar to Vainio’s (2007) who also reports no reliable connection between 
nnouncement effects and operating performance. The result is again different with those of 
rate focus is a decisive factor in the 
alue creation process. If we take a look at Table 12 regression results on industrial focus, we 
 
The regres
re
formance does not explain the value created through spin-offs in my sample
a
the U.S. studies. John and Ofek (1995) reported a positive relationship between stock price 
reaction at announcement and improvement in operating performance, measured as EBITD-
to-sales. Desai and Jain (1999) also conclude that the announcement period abnormal returns 
are significantly positively associated with the change in operating performance as well as 
focus. They also find that the change in operating performance is significantly positively 
associated with the change in focus. In other words, corpo
v
see that industrial focus is positively related to announcement effects also in my sample. 
However, this result is not statistically significant. Therefore, it can be that spin-offs in the 
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U.S. provide larger announcement effects and better improvement in operating performance 
because they result in more focused and efficient entities than their European counterparts. 
This could also be analysed in future research. 
 
The final hypothesis tackles one potential reason behind the differing results found in 
previous divestiture studies in the U.S. and Europe regarding the long run abnormal stock 
returns. H5 is stated as: 
 
H5: Post spin-off takeover activity has power in explaining the long-term 
abnormal stock returns. 
 
Motivated by the suggestion by Cusatis et al. (1993) that subsequent takeover activity is a 
decisive driver in the long run abnormal return in the U.S., I checked the takeover activity in 
my European sample. Very few parents or spun-off subsidiaries were taken over after the 
spin-off, so few (only 13) that separate calculation of long run abnormal performance would 
ot have been feasible. However, this result provides indirect evidence on the difference 
rs are very common following 
in-offs, and there are significant long run abnormal returns. In Europe both takeover 
activity and l -
2006. Theref using differing results on 
ng run abnormal returns in the U.S. and in Europe, also the subsequent takeover activity is 
poor previous decision and the relative disadvantage to competitors who do operate 
n
between the results from the two markets. In the U.S. takeove
sp
ong run abnormal returns are much lower, at least in my sample period of 1994
ore, in addition to the market efficiency explanation ca
lo
likely to contribute. Because no reliable test could be conducted, H5 cannot be rejected. 
 
A few results from Table 12 that were not dealt with in the hypotheses provide interesting 
insights as well. As mentioned in section 2, there were several arguments for and against 
geographic focus increasing value. As can be seen from Table 12, the effect of geographic 
focus in the sample of all spin-offs is positive and in the completed sample it is negative. 
Both coefficients are statistically insignificant. Arguments in favour of geographic focus 
increasing value can be reduced monitoring and coordination costs through reduced 
complexity, reversal of a bad decision by manager to diversify globally in order to reduce 
his/her own risk at the expense of shareholders and the reduction of cross-subsidisation of 
poorly performing divisions. Arguments in favour of a negative value impact caused by 
increased geographic focus can be reduced economies of scale in production, signalling of a 
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internationally. It would be interesting to distinguish between these different explanations, 
but as becomes clear from the nature of them, it is not possible. How could one for instance 
quantify what is a bad previous decision and when it is reversed? 
 
All in all, since the results regarding the effect of increased geographic focus are 
conclusive, we can assume that the strength of the arguments above are roughly of the 
o also report a positive but insignificant relationship between 
eographic focus and announcement effects for the European sample of all firms. 
 
Relative size as the ratio of the market capitalization of subsidiary 
ver the market capitalization of the parent at the announcement, is the only independent 
 one 
ssumes that spin-offs are results of decisions to detach assets or subsidiaries that do not have 
in
same magnitude and hence increasing geographic focus does not, on average, affect 
cumulative abnormal returns at announcement. This result is consistent with Veld and Veld-
Merkoulova (2004) wh
g
 of the spin-off, defined 
o
variable in my regressions that shows statistically significant explanation power in the 
cumulative abnormal returns. With a t-statistic of 2.4 for sample of all firms and 2.8 for the 
completed sample the result is significant at the 5% and 1% levels. Previous studies both in 
the U.S. and in Europe have reported similar findings. Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) ran 
five different regression models for abnormal returns and relative size showed positive and 
significant results, at the 5% level, in each of them. The results obtained from the U.S. 
studies are very similar. Hite and Owers (1983), Miles and Rosenfeld (1983), Krishnaswami 
and Subramaniam (1999) and Vijh (2002) all show highly significant size effect in value 
creation from divestitures. 
 
The relative size effect is quite difficult to explain by any simple theory. Intuitively, if
a
a good fit with the core assets and business of the parent company, then logically a removal 
of a relatively larger proportion of a poor match with the parent should result in more value 
being created. In other words, if divesting a subsidiary on average creates value, then 
divesting a larger subsidiary should create more value. And this is exactly what is observed 
in the empirical evidence. One must recall, however, that the logic does not run backwards. 
A parent company willing to increase its stock price naturally cannot conclude, based on this 
result, that it could do so by divesting its biggest subsidiary. Rather, this result can be 
interpreted in the following way. Assuming that each decision to spin off a subsidiary is 
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based on economic reasoning, it therefore creates value as the empirical evidence suggests. 
In this sample of rationally justified spin-offs, the ones that are relatively larger create more 
value to parent shareholders than the smaller ones, since the relative benefits of the spin-off 
are larger, on average. 
 
The results regarding the effect of increase in industrial focus on cumulative abnormal 
alue driver 
 spin-offs. However, looking at the regression coefficient for the industrial focus variable 
odels the significance level is 5% and in one 10%. In two of the 
odels the industrial focus variable fails to show statistically significant relationship with 
returns also reserve a few remarks. If we look at the announcement effects of the industrial 
focus-increasing sample in Table 12, we observe a positive cumulative abnormal return of 
2.38%, statistically significant at the 1% level. The sample including spin-offs from the 
related industry, i.e. non-focus increasing sample we observe positive but insignificant 
results. Furthermore, the difference between these two subsamples is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. From this evidence it seems that corporate focus is a significant v
in
we see that although the direction is positive, this result fails to show any statistical 
significance. Therefore my evidence suggests that the effect of industrial focus on value 
created through spin-offs is inconclusive. 
 
Previous studies have reported a much stronger relationship between increase in industrial 
focus and abnormal returns. Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) find positive and significant 
cumulative abnormal returns of 2.62% for their total sample, a positive and significant 3.57% 
for focus increasing sample and a positive but insignificant 0.76% for non-focus increasing 
sample. The results are very close to what I report. However, they also show that in three of 
their five regression models increase in industrial focus is a significant determinant of 
abnormal returns. In two m
m
abnormal returns. Thus there is a difference in results obtained from these two studies. The 
directions are the same, but the strengths of these variables in explaining the value creation 
vary. 
 
The connection between increase in industrial focus and announcement abnormal returns is 
even stronger in previous U.S. studies. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), Daley et al. 
(1997), Desai and Jain (1999) and Boone (2000) among others report a statistically 
significant difference between the announcement abnormal returns on focus increasing and 
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non-focus increasing spin-offs. Similar results have also been reported in papers studying 
equity carve-outs. In addition to difference in abnormal returns, these studies also show 
positive and statistically significant regression coefficients for increase in industrial focus. 
Based on these findings, it seems that focus has more emphasis as a value driver in spin-offs 
in the U.S. than it does in Europe. Further research is required however, preferably directly 
comparing the results from both markets over the same time period. 
ld-Merkoulova (2004) when attempting to explain 
e differences with their results and those from the U.S. studies. Or second, perhaps the 
g and consequently the full amount of the value being created is reflected in the stock 
rice immediately. Hence we would not witness any long run abnormal returns, as has been 
 
All these results together provide some general implications regarding the value creation 
from spin-offs in Europe as well as in the U.S. Simultaneously positive and significant 
abnormal returns at announcement, insignificant long run returns and insignificant changes in 
industry adjusted operating performance in Europe tell us that value is certainly created 
through spin-offs. Furthermore, in Europe it seems that these value effects are also 
immediately reflected in the stock price at the announcement and no further value is created 
later on. In the U.S. on the other hand, also the long run abnormal returns have been reported 
to be positive and significant. The same thing goes for the change in operational performance. 
Therefore, there can be two main explanations for these differences between the results in the 
two markets. First, either the European capital market is more efficient than its American 
counterpart, as suggested by Veld and Ve
th
American spin-offs somehow result in more efficient operations than European spin-offs, and 
when the companies later on show better results, this increase in value is transferred in the 
stock prices gradually over several years following the spin-off announcement. These 
explanations are quite closely linked. If the second argument were true, then it would mean 
that investors in the U.S. stock market cannot foresee the improved operating efficiency at 
announcement and therefore would not bid up the stock prices by the full amount of the 
value being created in the process. It is also possible and even likely that the efficiencies of 
the two capital markets do not differ. European investors may simply be equally incapable of 
foreseeing the changes in operational efficiency at announcement, but since operating 
performance does not improve, on average, after spin-offs this additional value component is 
missin
p
the case in the European studies done so far. 
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As mentioned earlier, the takeover activities following spin-offs between Europe and the U.S. 
differ substantially. Since takeovers are associated with relatively large acquisition premiums, 
their presence can lead to the long run abnormal returns reported in the U.S. but not existing 
in Europe. Therefore, future research could take samples from both markets over a very long 
time period so that there would be enough spin-offs that are subsequently taken over in 
Europe as well. Separate tests with different subsamples could shed light into the role of 
takeovers in value creation through spin-offs. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
 
7.1. Summary 
 
In this thesis I have examined the value creation through corporate divestitures, more 
specifically spin-offs. The sample consisted of European spin-offs that were announced 
between January 1st 1994 and June 30th 2006. There were three main objectives in the study; 
to check the stock market announcement effects of spin-offs, to find out the long run 
abnormal stock performance of these spin-offs and to analyse the industry-adjusted post spin-
off operating performance and takeover activity in order to explain the potential differences 
in the long-run abnormal stock performance in Europe and the U.S. 
 
I find positive and statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns of +1.83% to the 
shareholders of the parent company over (-1,1) days around the spin-off announcement. This 
value increases to 1.92% when only the sample of completed spin-offs is evaluated and 
further to 2.38% in the sample of only focus increasing spin-offs. The value creation is 
significantly related to the relative size of the spin-off. Increase in industrial focus, increase 
in geographical focus and change in operating performance show no significant explanation 
power. I also find insignificant long run abnormal returns for each subperiod in the four-year 
period around the spin-off announcement. Similarly, the change in operating performance, 
measured as the change in industry-adjusted return on assets, is not significantly different 
from zero over a five-year period around the spin-off announcement. The subsequent 
takeover activity after spin-offs is much lower than that reported in the U.S. studies. 
 
These results imply that spin-offs create value in Europe and that this value is reflected in the 
parent stock price immediately at announcement since no abnormal stock performance was 
found in the long run. The sources of this value creation still remain unclear. Since operating 
performance does not improve after spin-offs, the contribution of improved efficiency as a 
value driver is limited. On the other hand, the relative size of the spin-off is positively related 
to the value creation, suggesting that efficiency does play its part. However, based on my 
results no efficiency change is reflected in the accounting measures over the two-year period 
after the spin-off. Thus the answer to my first research question, whether spin-offs create 
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value at announcement, is yes while the answer to the second one, whether operating 
fficiency improves after spin-offs, is no. 
potential, and now reported, differing results 
etween Europe and the U.S. Two possible implications arise. One possibility is that the 
d translate into long run 
bnormal returns. This effect is minimal in Europe since takeover activity is lower. 
e
 
One objective of this study was to explain the 
b
level of efficiency between the markets differs, also explaining the differences in the long run 
abnormal returns. The second and perhaps more convincing explanation is that the effects of 
spin-offs to operating performance of their parents differ in the two markets. This would 
explain the differences in the long-run abnormal returns given that the efficiencies of the two 
markets do not differ. Another plausible explanation is the post-spin-off takeover activity that 
is much higher in the U.S. than in Europe. The related acquisition premiums in the U.S. 
increase the long run returns of previously spun-off companies an
a
 
 
7.2. Suggestions for further research 
 
I have presented some potential reasons for the differing results in Europe and the U.S. 
regarding wealth effects from spin-offs, especially the long-run abnormal returns. Future 
research could take these findings as the starting point and further explore the differences. 
The sample could include spin-offs from both Europe and the U.S. over a longer time period 
so that there would be a sufficient amount of subsequent takeovers from Europe as well. 
Separate tests with different subsamples could shed light into the role of takeovers as well as 
other variables in value creation through spin-offs. 
 
One step further would be to use a global sample to see whether the effects of spin-offs in the 
rest of the world are closer to those of Europe or the U.S. This approach would also enable 
more variables in the analysis, specifically country specific and e.g. legislative differences. 
However, this study would most likely be more fruitful later on when there will be more data 
available from the Asian growing economies such as India and China, as currently a vast 
majority of spin-offs is likely to come either from Europe or the U.S. 
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